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ABSTRACT 
 
Web applications have become increasingly popular due to their potential for businesses’ 
high revenue gain through global reach. Along with these opportunities, also come 
challenges in terms of Web application security. The increased rise in the number of data-
driven applications has also seen an increased rise in their systematic attacks. Cyber-
attacks exploit Web application vulnerabilities. Attack trends show a major increase in 
Web application vulnerabilities caused by improper implementation of information-flow 
control methods and they account for more than 50% of all Web application vulnerabilities 
found in the year 2013. 
Static code analysis using methods of information-flow control is a widely acknowledged 
technique to secure Web applications. Whilst this technique has been found to be both very 
effective and efficient in finding Web application vulnerabilities, specific tools are highly 
dependent on the programming language. This thesis leverages Semantic Web 
technologies in order to offer a common language through source code represented using 
the Resource Description Framework format, whereby reasoning can be applied to securely 
test Web applications. 
In this thesis, we present a framework that extracts source code facts from various 
programming languages at a variable-level of granularity using Abstract Syntax Trees 
(ASTs) generated using language grammars and the ANTLR parser generator. The 
methodology for detecting Web application vulnerabilities implements three phases: entry 
points identification, tracing information-flow and vulnerability detection using the Jena 
framework inference mechanism and rules describing patterns of source code. 
The approach discussed in this thesis is found to be effective and practical in finding Web 
application vulnerabilities with the limitation that it can only detect patterns that are used 
as training data or very similar patterns. False positives are caused by limitations of the 
language grammar, but they do not affect the accuracy of the security vulnerability 
detection method in identifying the correct Web application vulnerability. 
 
xi 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The author takes this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge the assistance and 
contributions of the few people who had faith in this undertaking. 
 
Deserving special mention are my supervisors, Dr. Robert Layton, Assoc. Prof. Peter 
Vamplew and Dr. Paul Watters, for their guidance, patience and advice during the course 
of my thesis. Their experience was proven invaluable to me and this thesis would have not 
existed without them. 
 
And to my family, which provided continuous moral support from a distant continent 
during the whole duration of my course and especially during those times when I was 
doubtful of my strength to finish. 
 
And to Ahmad Azab, for having fascinating history discussions during work breaks. You 
have enlightened me with the knowledge of a culture that is incredibly fascinating. 
 
And to my dearest friends, Gary Holdsworth, Boyd Williams, Ike Anyiam, Michele 
Catasta, Dr. Gabi Ditu and many more. Their company has made my time outside the 
office as equally as good as the time behind the desk. Their worries and doubts built 
strength in me and helped me achieve great things. For that, I am grateful. Their sense of 
humor is one I have never seen before. So, thank you. 
 
And last, but not least, to all the researchers at ICSL who provided a friendly and 
welcoming working atmosphere. I honestly, sincerely and from the bottom of my heart, do 
not think I could have finished this work any place else. 
 
The work presented in this document was supported (in part) by the Federation University, 
the Australian Federal Police, IBM, Westpac and the Victorian Government. 
  

1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The security of Web applications is an important issue recognized at an academic level 
through continuous research of new solutions to protect the confidentiality of sensitive data 
in Web applications (Yip, Wang, Zeldovich, & Kaashoek, 2009; Baca, Carlsson, Petersen, 
& Lundberg, 2013; Roy, Porter, Bond, Mckinley, & Witchel, 2009). At industry level, a 
recent report conducted by Ponemon Institute (Ponemon, 2013) entitled “The Post Breach 
Boom” shows that data breaches cause substantial losses, with 45 percent of losses 
exceeding 500,000 dollars. According to the “2012 Data Breach Investigative Report” by 
Verizon, most attacks are caused by hacking and malware (WhiteHat Security, 2013). The 
majority of attacks targeted the least protected areas: Web applications. 
In practice, developers of Web applications that contain sensitive/hidden data will surround 
the implementation code with security features to protect the sensitive data. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to guarantee that a piece of complex software does not contain some flaws 
(Ritchey & Ammann, 2000). Developers make mistakes, which results in implementation 
bugs that can be exploited in order to gain access to unauthorized information. 
Static code analysis is a common method successfully applied by industries to improve 
software security by detecting code susceptible to malicious attacks (Baca, Carlsson, 
Petersen, & Lundberg, 2013). Static code analysis is a technique that examines an 
application’s source code to assess its security risk (Louridas, 2006). A primary design 
technique of static analysis is control flow testing at the program’s unit level, where source 
code is reviewed in order to find any patterns discordant with the non-interference 
(Hammer, Krinke, & Nodes, 2006) security policy. The non-interference security policy 
ensures the robustness of a system by guaranteeing that the application does not leak 
confidential information to unauthorized users of the system.  
Existing academic solutions that apply static code analysis to control the flow of 
confidential information have a common limitation: their proposal for new scripting 
languages (Zdancewic, 2004). This clear shortcoming makes proposed solutions infeasible 
to be applied to existing systems, and consequently to traditional programming languages 
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(i.e. Java, PHP). Yet, surprisingly, there are not many efforts made to develop a method 
that can be uniformly applied to secure test data-driven applications independently of their 
underlying code (Ureche, Layton, & Watters, 2012).  We propose employing Semantic 
Web technologies to transform source code written in various traditional programming 
languages to a common format, so that reasoning using inference engines can be applied to 
assuring code security.  
The Semantic Web is the grand vision of machines understanding the meaning of 
information and rests on the theory that this can be achieved by accommodating semantics 
of Web data (Gruber, 2008). While critics speculated the Semantic Web vision to be 
infeasible (Richardson, Agrawal, & Domingos, 2003), advocates validated the original 
concept with applications in industry, biology and human science (Feigenbaum, Herman, 
Hongsermeier, Neumann, & Stephens, 2007). Typically, data from various sources is 
represented as triples in the Resource Description Framework (RDF) format with the 
purpose of being uniformly queried by machines in order to solve a specific problem or 
answer a specific question (Arenas & Perez, 2011). In this thesis, we turn to static code 
analysis using RDF. 
Although the literature proposes a few RDF converters for source code, these services are 
not suitable for our needs. For example, Keivanloo et al. (2011) proposed the SeCOLD 
framework with the primary focus on providing a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 
generation schema for sharing source code facts. Ganapathy and Sagayaraj (2011) 
extracted metadata from source code (i.e. author, method name and description) with the 
intention of providing easy reuse of existing code. Both services consider only the Java 
programming language.  
In light of this, it is imperative to both recognize and acknowledge that a method that 
represents traditional programming languages within a common lingua can possibly 
provide the most effective means to uniformly query for vulnerabilities in data-driven 
applications, thus offering a language independent approach towards securing Web 
systems.  
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1.1. Motivations 
Web applications have become increasingly popular due to their potential for businesses’ 
high revenue gain. Using Web applications, businesses can potentially reach anyone with 
an internet connection at any time, in order to sell their products. Online shopping is a 
cheaper alternative due to the low costs of running an online store. Along with these 
opportunities for both sellers and buyers, also come challenges in terms of Web application 
security. The increased rise in the number of data-driven applications has also seen an 
increased rise in their systematic attacks. These attacks target software bugs, design flaws 
and configuration defects, depicted in Figure 1 and account for major losses of revenue and 
user mistrust in online companies (Liu & Cheng, 2009).  
 
Software
bugs
Configuration
defects
Design
flaws
Vulnerabilities Exploits Breaches
Social
engineering
 
Figure 1 Causes of cyber-attacks. Risk sources are depicted using white boxes (Liu & Cheng, 2009) 
Section 1.1.1 will present the trends in Web application vulnerabilities and cyber-attacks, 
and thus the motivation for our work. 
1.1.1. Web Applications’ Attacks and Trends  
Web applications constitute a major target for computer “hackers”. High profile 
organisations and companies, such as: NASA (Bloomberg, 2008), Sony (The Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2011) and Citigroup Inc. (Business Spectator Pty Ltd., 2011), have 
suffered cyber-attacks that lead to these hackers gaining access to unauthorized data and 
other information (such as bank account and credit card details, contact information, email 
addresses) that could lead to identity theft (Stabek, Watters, & Layton, 2010). According to 
security company McAfee, the last five years have seen the biggest series of cyber-attacks 
in history, including the infiltration of 72 international organisations as well as the United 
Nations (Guardian News and Media Limited, 2011). To further motivate the need for 
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securing data in Web applications through information-flow control, we will present 
publicly available statistics conducted by several government and not-for-profit 
organizations focused on improving the security of software.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a government organization 
that has gathered Web vulnerability data for many years. NIST generates statistical data 
through a National Vulnerability Database
1
 (NVD), a U.S. government repository of 
standards based vulnerability management data. Figure 2 shows generated data for the 
number of vulnerabilities caused by insufficient input validation from year 2004 to 2013.  
 
Figure 2 NIST yearly statistics of the number of vulnerabilities caused by insufficient input validation 
As Figure 2 depicts, the last six years have seen a major increase in Web vulnerabilities 
caused by insufficient input validation, with the highest number of vulnerabilities 
corresponding to the year 2013. We can attribute this high number to the increased 
popularity of Web applications. We can thus speculate that unless remedial action is taken, 
this number is only going to rise in future years. Input validation vulnerabilities are caused 
by an application improperly validating or missing validation of user data and thereby 
                                                          
1
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affecting the control flow or data flow of a program (Scholte, Robertson, Balzarotti, & 
Kirda, 2012).  
We used data generated from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) to calculate the 
number of vulnerabilities caused by improper information-flow control in relation to other 
vulnerabilities (e.g. configuration, authentication issues, and credential management). As 
depicted in Figure 3 the vulnerabilities caused by improper implementation of information-
flow control methods account for more than 50% of all Web vulnerabilities found in the 
year 2013. 
 
Figure 3 Number of information-flow control vulnerabilities in relation to other vulnerabilities for the 
year 2013 
We classified vulnerabilities belonging to the information-flow control category as the 
ones caused by improper input validation or disclosure of information, such as cross-site 
scripting, SQL injection and information leakage. These vulnerabilities and others are 
described in Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. Figure 4 depicts their proportion in relation to the 
total of number of vulnerabilities that are due to information-flow control issues in the year 
2013. As we can see, the cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability is the most prevalent 
issue, followed by information disclosure with the SQL injection coming on the third 
56% 
1% 
4% 
4% 3% 
5% 
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4% 
Information control
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Configuration
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Credential Management
Race conditions
Cryptographic Issues
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place. In fact, according to an application vulnerability trends report conducted by Cenzic 
in 2013 (Cenzic, 2013), XSS has been leading the list in terms of frequency of occurrence 
since 2011, significantly rising each year. 
 
Figure 4 Proportion of Web vulnerabilities caused by improper implementation of control flow methods 
in 2013 
In this section, we have shown the importance of a method that controls the flow of 
information in data-driven applications. The next section will further highlight the 
importance of our work, identifying the gap in literature and therefore, the need for a 
uniform static code analysis of programs which are potentially vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
1.1.2. An Independent Framework for Information-flow Control 
Section 1.1.1 presented the real-world (financial) motivation for our work. A technical 
motivation is driven from a shortcoming of existing static code analysis solutions 
identified as a challenge in (Zdancewic, 2004). 
Zdancewic identified a major limitation of existing systems that control the flow of 
information. These systems have focused their attention on giving better, more precise 
definitions of non-interference policies, which is not the real challenge in building secure, 
sound systems. The more significant challenge is to get the static code analysis application 
12% 
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8% 
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Code injection
Information Disclosure
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OS Command Injection
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interoperable with existing systems. Existing applications that either employ ad-hoc 
mechanisms (e.g. Perl’s taint mode (Perl, 2014)), or implement special type systems (Li, 
2005), have limited applicability (languages that satisfy specific conditions (Hammer, 
2010) or they apply to a single programming language (Graf, Hecker, & Mohr, 2013)). 
These applications are reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
A static code analysis application that can interoperate with existing systems, and thus 
provide a language independent solution has been emphasized as important, in terms of 
practicality, in (Graf, Hecker, & Mohr, 2013; Rakić & Budimac, 2011 and Hammer, 2010) 
to name a few. Benefits, such as precision, scalability and practicality of using a language 
independent approach have been demonstrated in (Hammer, 2010). In this paper, the 
authors used program dependence graphs for information-flow control, but their 
application is only limited to languages that compile to Java bytecode.  
1.1.3. White-box Testing versus Black-box Testing 
Two common methods are used for detecting security vulnerabilities: white-box testing 
(Beizer, 1990) and black-box testing (Beizer, 1995). Static code analysis is usually 
performed as part of white-box testing (OWASP, 2013). 
Whilst white-box testing methods have been proven to be effective in detecting more 
security vulnerabilities than black-box testing methods, testing should be complementary 
in order to ensure the security of a Web application (Finifter & Wagner, 2011). Static code 
analysis complements dynamic analysis by examining the flow of information for all 
execution paths and variables and not just the ones exercised at runtime (Masri, Podgurski, 
& Leon, 2004). This feature of static analysis is particularly useful in assuring a program’s 
security because most security attacks exercise an application in unforeseen and untested 
ways (Intel, 2012). 
Although it falls out of the scope of this thesis to compare the two methods of testing a 
Web application, research (Finifter & Wagner, 2011) shows that some types of security 
vulnerabilities were not detected using a black-box method. White-box testing has been 
proven to detect authentication/authorization bypass Web application vulnerabilities, 
compared to black-box testing which was not able to detect these types of security 
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vulnerabilities. Moreover, black-box testing detected few Stored XSS vulnerabilities, 
compared to white-box testing. Figure 5 illustrates the types of vulnerabilities detected 
using white-box and black-box methods. White-box testing is represented using the term 
Manual. 
 
Figure 5 Vulnerabilities by vulnerability class (Finifter & Wagner, 2011) 
In light of this, this thesis proposed methodology implements a static code analysis 
approach to detect Web application security vulnerabilities. 
1.2. Overview of Web Application Vulnerabilities and Ad-hoc 
Solutions 
As shown in Section 1.1.1, according to the study conducted by Cenzic (2013), most issues 
in Web application security are caused by improper input/output validation. The 
vulnerabilities resulting from these issues are also known as information-flow control 
vulnerabilities and this thesis focuses on them.  
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The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) published a study that further 
confirms the numbers from the Cenzic statistics. Every three years, OWASP releases its 
top 10 Web vulnerabilities ranking list. The top place in both 2010 and 2013 is held by 
vulnerabilities caused by improper input validation (OWASP, 2013). It should be 
mentioned that efforts to prevent the attacks caused by this type of vulnerabilities have 
been successfully applied in the industry by Perl’s (Perl, 2014) and Ruby’s (Thomas, 
Fowler, & Hunt, 2004) taint mode with very good outcomes (Hurst, 2004). Unfortunately, 
both mechanisms are dependent on the respective scripting language. More details are 
given in Section 2.2.1. 
In order to define our problem statement we chose to classify the security vulnerabilities 
caused by improper input/output validation in two main categories: Input Validation 
Vulnerabilities and Information Leakage.  
1.2.1. Input Validation Vulnerabilities 
Typically, user input capable of compromising a Web application’s security is received 
through HTML forms. If the user input is not properly sanitized, serious security problems 
can occur (Scholte, Robertson, Balzarotti, & Kirda, 2012). Mostly, attackers of Web 
applications that exploit input validation errors use cleverly crafted user input in HTML 
form fields in order to obtain confidential information or engage in a DoS (denial-of-
service) attack. 
Sanitization of user input is dependent on the context in which the user data is used and 
thus, difficult to be implemented correctly and relevantly. For example, while a PHP 
filter_input function is generally suitable for sanitizing input, it would not be 
recommended for a SQL injection attack (SQLIA). In this situation, user input sanitization 
should be implemented using the mysql_real_escape_string() or prepare statements and 
parameter binding, as filter_input cannot guarantee that it will prevent all SQL injection 
attacks in any situation (OWASP, 2014).   
Unfortunately, when the proper sanitization is not in place, vulnerabilities must be 
identified and fixed. Next, we illustrate vulnerabilities caused by improper input 
sanitization and their context dependent solution. We aim to show that different 
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sanitization solutions apply to different contexts and evidently, to different programming 
languages, making it very easy for developers to make mistakes and leave room for 
vulnerabilities.  
Cross-site scripting. As discussed in Section 1.1.1, XSS (cross-site scripting) has been 
leading the list in terms of frequency of occurrence since 2011, significantly rising each 
year. This type of attack is typically found in Web applications and it enables attackers to 
inject client-side scripts into webpages. A cross-site scripting vulnerability is present 
where a Web application uses input data to generate a webpage’s content to be displayed 
back to the user, without validating or sanitizing the input. Common data-driven 
applications vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks are online message boards, where 
users can submit HTML formatted messages that will persistently appear on the board’s 
webpage.  
Cross-site scripting is mostly used for transmitting private data, like cookies and session 
information, with the malicious intent of using it to impersonate other users and access 
sensitive information. Typically, a malicious user will post a message to a board containing 
a <script>, e.g. <script>savetofile(document.cookie);</script>. 
For any user that visits the page where the script was injected, assuming that there is no 
prevention of a cross-site scripting attack, their cookie information is saved to the file that 
the attacker specified, which could be used to log in as the specific user. 
There are alternative ways to the <script> tags in which XSS attacks can be conducted. 
Other HTML tags can have the same effect. For example, <body 
onload=alert(‘document.cookie’)>. XSS attacks work because they bypass 
access controls, such as the same-origin policy. The same-origin policy prevents scripts 
from accessing content from a location other than the origin of the script. Because a cross-
site injected script is running from website X, according to the same-origin policy, it can 
read website X’s cookie information. Access to cookie information is legitimate as the 
request came from a trusted source, e.g. the same website that was granted permission to 
the system’s resources. 
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For example, the following PHP code is vulnerable to an XSS attack because the age 
parameter is read from an untrusted source (i.e. input from user) and echoed back to the 
user through the generated website page. 
<?php 
$age = $_REQUEST ['age']; 
?> 
<html> 
<body>Your age is <?php echo $age; ?></body> 
</html> 
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability and instead of legitimate data, she could submit 
JavaScript through the age parameter, such as the following: 
http://xss.vulnerable.website.com/vuln.php?age= 
%3Cscript%3Ealert(%22Hello%22)%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E 
The text “Hello” is echoed back to the browser, which demonstrates that the website is 
vulnerable to an XSS attack. There are numerous ways to prevent an XSS attack and they 
range from basic HTML escaping of five characters significant in XML ($, <, >, “, 
’) to employing libraries specially designed for sanitizing HTML input. For example, the 
following PHP code uses the HTMLPurifier
2
 library to sanitize HTML: 
require_once '/path/to/HTMLPurifier.auto.php'; 
 
$conf = HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault(); 
$purifier = new HTMLPurifier($conf); 
$clean_html = $purifier->purify($vuln_html); 
For Java, OWASP provides a similar library
3
 to sanitize HTML: 
import org.owasp.html.Sanitizers; 
import org.owasp.html.PolicyFactory; 
PolicyFactory sanitizer =   
              Sanitizers.FORMATTING.and(Sanitizers.BLOCKS); 
String clean_html = sanitizer.sanitize(vuln_html); 
Such dedicated libraries to sanitize HTML are straightforward to use, but their policy must 
be updated, as valid tags could be stripped off, especially most of the modern HTML5 and 
CSS3 tags and attributes. If manual HTML escaping is necessary, then the disadvantage is 
                                                          
2
 http://htmlpurifier.org/ 
3
 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project 
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that developers can mistakenly overlook some tags and thus still leave opportunities for 
attacks to occur.  
Therefore, when considering the prevention of cross-site scripting attacks, developers must 
be aware of the context in which they can occur, whether this is a different programming 
language or newer markup languages. 
Format string attacks. Printf(user_input) is a common statement in C programs. When 
user input is used, it is imperative that the printf  format function uses format string 
parameters, such as, printf(“%s”, user_input). If not, the user input can be treated as a 
format string and when an attacker exploits this vulnerability, he can submit 
“%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s” as input, resulting in the command 
printf(“%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s”) being executed. This can result in crashing the 
program as for every %s the program will retrieve data from the stack to use it as a 
memory address fetching whatever is located in the memory at that address. If the content 
fetched from the stack is not a legitimate address for which corresponding memory data 
exists, the program will crash.  
In this case, the vulnerability can be found in C programs and to circumvent it, developers 
must validate the user input by using format string parameters. 
SQL injection. A SQLIA is a type of injection attack, where SQL queries are injected via 
the input data from the Web client to the data-driven application. These types of attacks 
can have a wide range of consequences:  
 Confidentiality: access to sensitive data from the database (e.g. customers credit 
card number) 
 Authentication: exploit poor authentication logic and log in as a different user  
 Authorization: change authorization privileges if available in the database  
 Integrity: changes to the database data via SQL commands (Insert/Update/Delete) 
To illustrate how a SQLIA works, we will assume that a Web application retrieves data 
about a person using the following SQL command in PHP. We used the reserved variable 
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$_POST to show that input data is retrieved from the client via a POST request and thus 
is not safe: 
 SELECT age, email, marital_status, position  
FROM members  
WHERE full_name = ‘$_POST[full_name]’; 
 
Next, we assume a malicious user is trying to compromise the integrity of the members 
database by deleting it entirely. Because there is no sanitization in place, it is sufficient that 
the attacker submits John Doe’; DROP TABLE members; -- in place of the full 
name POST variable. This constructs the following SQL command, which in fact executes 
two SQL queries. 
  SELECT age, email, marital_status, position  
      FROM members WHERE full_name = ‘John Doe’;  
      DROP TABLE members; --’; 
 
The first one retrieves data about the person named John Doe and the second one deletes 
the members database entirely. The pair of hyphens is used to mark the beginning of a 
comment in SQL and thus everything encountered after this mark is ignored. 
This example shows how little effort is required to compromise the integrity of a database 
when proper input validation is not implemented. 
In order to handle such situations, developers must look at the context in which they occur. 
For example, if an email address is read via a POST request, one way to sanitize input is to 
make sure it only contains these characters: 
 
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz 
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ 
0123456789 
@.-_+ 
Unfortunately, this method does not apply in all situations (e.g. when an input field is used 
for a description of a user profile where semicolons, quotes and other characters can be 
present). 
The recommended way (OWASP, 2008) in which user data should be handled is through 
prepared statements. Using prepared statements or parameterized queries enables the 
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database to distinguish between code and data.  In the example given above the database 
engine will in fact try to match John Doe’; DROP TABLE members; -- against 
records corresponding to full name data, thus not constructing new SQL queries. In PHP, 
this can be achieved using the following syntax: 
$full_name = $_POST[full_name]; 
$stmt = $mysqli->prepare ("SELECT age, email,      
        marital_status, position FROM members  
        WHERE full_name = ?") 
$stmt->bind_param(1, $full_name); 
$stmt->execute(); 
Java has a different syntax: 
String full_name = request.getParameter("full_name");   
String query = "SELECT age, email, marital_status, position   
               FROM members WHERE full_name = ?"; 
PreparedStatement ps = connection.prepareStatement(query ); 
ps.setString( 1, full_name); 
ResultSet results = ps.executeQuery( ); 
 
Fortunately, many programming languages support parameterized queries, but when 
performance becomes an issue (MSDN, 2013), stored procedures can be used instead (Ke, 
Muthuprasanna, & Kothari, 2006). The difference between parameterized queries and 
stored procedures is that the database defines and stores the SQL code for a stored 
procedure, thus making the programming code less portable and reusable.  
As shown, SQL injection attacks can be prevented in numerous ways, but the approach 
used is chosen based on the context of the vulnerability. Sometimes, performance can be 
an important issue and thus, while prepared statements are the preferred way of 
implementing security, they can also cause problems and thus, alternative defenses should 
be considered. Moreover, every programming language uses a different syntax, creating an 
opportunity for developers to make mistakes.  
Command injection. The essence of command injection attacks has been captured in (Su, 
2006).  The authors attributed the susceptibility of Web applications to this large class of 
attacks to two causes: improper handling of user input and a semantic gap. The semantic 
gap is explained by the difference in the way in which databases and Web applications 
interpret query strings. Whilst databases view them as well-defined, meaningful 
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commands, Web applications typically interpret query strings as an unorganized sequence 
of characters.  
Although security can be enforced in the database and it is recommended by Oracle 
(2014), enforcing security in the database can fail to make an application’s security 
implementation modular or reusable and thus, less portable, since the same application 
using a different database will need a reimplementation of the security policy. Therefore, a 
scalable security application needs to detect if user input is improperly handled. 
Although SQLIA are part of the command injections class of attacks, there are other means 
in which these attacks can be executed, such as through command line arguments. For 
example, the following C code reads a filename via the command line and displays its 
contents to the user: 
int main(char* argc, char** argv) { 
 char cmd[CMD_MAX] = "/usr/bin/cat "; 
 strcat(cmd, argv[1]); 
 system(cmd); 
} 
 
This program will work as expected when a legitimate file name is used. However, if an 
attacker uses the input “;rm –rf /” instead, the system call will not execute the cat 
command due the insufficient number of arguments and if run with root privileges it will 
continue by recursively deleting all the contents of nearly every writable mounted 
filesystem on the computer. Eventually, the computer will crash due to missing a crucial 
file or directory.  
A solution to this problem is to sanitize command line user input. Note that in this case 
stored procedures and parameterized queries do not apply, thus the developer is faced with 
an entirely different context than shown in previous sections.  
HTTP response splitting. HTTP response splitting is a Web application vulnerability that 
results from the failure to properly sanitize user input read in an HTTP request and 
subsequently used to generate an HTTP response. An HTTP response splitting 
vulnerability allows an attacker to break the HTTP response into two or more responses, 
which will both be handled by the server. HTTP responses are separated by a carriage 
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return (CR, ASCII 0x0D) and a line feed (LF, ASCII 0x0A), therefore this exploit is 
possible if the application allows input containing these characters. 
For example, the following Java code is vulnerable to the HTTP response splitting attack, 
assuming that the fullName variable’s content is read from an untrusted source: 
String name = request.getParameter(fullName); 
Cookie cookie = new Cookie("name", name); 
cookie.setMaxAge(cookieExpiration); 
response.addCookie(cookie); 
 
If the Web application reads as input ‘John Doe’ and saves it as the content of the 
fullName variable, then the subsequent HTTP response will have the following content: 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Length: length 
… 
Set-Cookie: name=John Doe 
… 
Instead of valid input, a malicious attacker can use the following value for the fullName 
variable, resulting in a second HTTP response completely controlled by the attacker. 
‘John Doe 
 
HTTP/1.1 200 OK 
Content-Type: text/html 
Content-Length: 32 
<html>Malicious code here</html>’ 
In order to prevent an HTTP response splitting vulnerability, a developer can choose a 
white-listing approach, where the input can be checked to only allow permissible 
characters. In the example above, the application should allow only characters ranging 
from Aa to Zz. Alternatively, if the input can contain any characters, developers can 
remove all carriage returns that are followed by line feeds. In addition, there are libraries 
that validate untrusted input, such as Validator4 in Java. However, for optimal results, 
the chosen solution must be based on the context in which an HTTP response splitting 
vulnerability could exist. 
                                                          
4
 http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/javax/xml/validation/Validator.html 
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E-mail injection. E-mail injection, or e-mail header injection, is an attack usually 
performed to send spam emails. By knowing the MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail 
Extensions) encoding, an attacker is able to inject extra headers, for example a ‘Bcc’ 
(Blind Carbon Copy) field to add recipients for whom their email addresses will be hidden. 
Some spammers do not find it necessary that the recipients email addresses be hidden and 
use a ‘Cc’ (Carbon Copy) field instead. A general description of the PHP mail function is 
as follows: 
<?php mail($recipient, $subject, $message, $headers); ?> 
A legitimate way to call this function could have the following form: 
<?php mail(“recipient@provider.com”, “Hello”, “Hi,\n9am 
meeting tomorrow.\nJohn.”, “From: sender@provider2.com”); ?> 
We will assume that the data used in the $headers is read from a user of the application 
and thus, not trusted. If the PHP email function headers are not properly sanitized, an 
attacker can inject new fields, causing the application to send emails to other recipients. 
According to RFC 822
5
 fields are separated by a line feed (LF, ASCII 0x0A). Therefore, if 
an attacker calls the PHP mail function with the following parameters: 
<?php mail(“recipient@provider.com”, “Hello”, “Hi,\n9am 
meeting tomorrow.\nJohn.”, “From: 
sender@provider2.com%0ACc:recipient@provider3.com%0ABcc:vict
im1@provider4.com,victim2@provider5.com”); ?> 
the corresponding email data will be: 
To: recipient@provider.com 
Subject: Hello 
From: sender@provider2.com 
Cc:recipient@provider3.com 
Bcc:victim1@provider4.com,victim2@provider5.com 
  
Hi, 
9am meeting tomorrow. 
John. 
The attacker has therefore, injected the email headers successfully using the ‘Cc’ and ‘Bcc’ 
fields, allowing him to send spam emails to his victims. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc822.txt 
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A solution to this problem is to check the user data for line feeds using regular expressions 
in PHP code: eregi("(\r)”, $from) or (value.indexOf("\n") != -1) in 
Java and declining to send emails that contain line feed characters in the headers under 
inspection. There are also third party classes that protect against this type of attack, such as 
PHP’s PEAR Mail6. The chosen solution should be based on the context and possible 
performance considerations. 
1.2.2. Information Leakage 
Section 1.2.1 focuses on poorly validated user input. However, many of the encountered 
concerns also apply to non-validated or poorly validated output passed from the Web 
application to its users.  
A common Web application vulnerability caused by improperly validating output data is 
information leaks. An information leak commonly occurs when too much information is 
revealed through exception message printings, as in the following Java example: 
try { 
       /.../ 
} catch (Exception e) { 
       System.out.println(e); 
} 
Printed debug information, stack traces or path information may be exposed to end users. 
Many times this leaked information can be helpful to attackers because it reveals 
implementation details and can be used to exploit vulnerabilities. 
One solution to verify that sensitive information is not leaked to users is an automated 
approach (Morisset & Oliveira, 2007) that uses vulnerability scanning tools to generate 
error messages. Security experts can then verify the error messages and ensure that no 
sensitive information is disclosed to users of the application. 
Manual approaches can be successfully used as well and are based on static code analysis 
tools that search for patterns in code that leak information or cause improper error handling 
(Walker, 2010). Therefore, testing for security violations due to non-validated output fits 
well into our source code facts extraction framework described in Chapter 3 and the same 
                                                          
6
 http://pear.php.net/package/Mail/ 
19 
 
concepts of inspecting input validation vulnerabilities are also applicable to information 
leaks.  
1.3. Problem Statement 
The motivation for our research was given in Section 1.1. Web vulnerabilities clearly pose 
serious security problems resulting in substantial consequences. Therefore, we have 
identified two motivations: financial and technical, driven from a shortcoming of existing 
static code analysis solutions. Specifically, businesses benefit financially from using Web 
applications due to their anytime availability and the low cost of running an online store. 
However, Web applications are an easy target for systematic attacks due to software bugs, 
design flaws and configuration defects whilst accounting for major losses of revenue and 
user mistrust. 
Furthermore, Section 1.2 presents an overview of the types of Web vulnerabilities targeted 
by our research and their current ad-hoc solutions. It shows that different vulnerabilities 
have different solutions and that the same vulnerability can have different solutions for 
different contexts, thus making it very hard for a Web application to be security proof.  
We have thus identified two problems:  
1. undesirable effects that Web vulnerabilities can cause when properly exploited by 
attackers 
2. difficulties faced by programmers to write Web applications with no security flaws 
According to the study conducted by Cenzic (2013), presented in Section 1.1.1, most 
issues in Web application security are caused by improper input/output validation. The 
vulnerabilities resulting from these issues are also known as information-flow control 
vulnerabilities and this thesis is focused on them. The introduction chapter shows that 
static code analysis is a common method successfully applied by industries to improve 
software security by detecting code susceptible to malicious attacks. 
In light of this, research towards powerful static code analysis tools for detecting Web 
vulnerabilities caused by improper flow control represents an important step for improving 
the security of Web applications and the consequent societal benefits. 
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1.3.1. Research Questions 
This research will address the limitations of applicability to existing Web application 
systems of previous approaches (described in Section 2.2) and determine if Semantic Web 
technologies can provide a language independent method using a pattern-based static code 
analysis approach. This research aims to answer the following question: 
Can Semantic Web technologies applied to information-flow control provide a language 
independent method, using a pattern-based static code analysis approach, to address the 
limitation of previous works in terms of applicability to existing Web application systems? 
Most previous approaches propose a new scripting language for developing Web 
application systems, so the programmers are faced with the problem of learning a new 
language to develop a Web application and rewriting existing applications in the proposed 
language. 
Firstly, the proposed method aims to be applicable to existing Web application systems 
written in different traditional scripting languages (PHP, Java, Python) while at the same 
time using a pattern-based static code analysis approach. Secondly, the proposed method 
automates a significant proportion of the work involved to model code, by not requiring 
the developers to rewrite the applications using a proposed scripting language. A summary 
of this thesis’ contributions is given below. 
1.4. Summary of Thesis Contributions  
In research on security testing data-driven applications using static checks, we aim to 
implement a solution that it is independent of the input programming language. Zdancewic 
identified this shortcoming as a challenge in (Zdancewic, 2004). Therefore, this thesis 
makes three main contributions in the area of static code analysis: 
 It presents a new algorithm that converts source code into a common format 
providing for uniform static code analysis  
 It develops a method that represents source code facts with the finest granularity, 
suitable for implementing information-flow control checking 
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 It presents a rule-based semantic reasoner that detects Web vulnerabilities in data-
driven applications 
1.4.1. Uniform Static Code Analysis  
A common limitation of previous approaches that perform static code analysis to detect 
Web vulnerabilities in data-driven Web systems are their dependence on the programming 
language of the system under examination (Zdancewic, 2004). We propose an algorithm 
that converts source code written in different programming languages to a common format 
to allow for uniform static code analysis. Most tools that offer a standardized source code 
representation are limited to one programming language and their output dataset is coarse-
grained and thus not suitable for our application scope. A recently proposed framework 
that converts source code to an independent form (Rakić, Budimac, & Savic, 2013) uses 
enriched Concrete Syntax Trees (eCST) (Rakić & Budimac, 2011) to uniformly represent 
source code, but the format is a recently proposed, non-standardized description of 
computer programs. 
A few Semantic Web frameworks used to extract source code facts are described in 
Section 2.3.4, but they only provide a coarse granularity representation that does not allow 
the implementation of information-flow control methods and they apply to only one 
programming language. As no other Semantic Web frameworks solutions exist for source 
code representation (Keivanloo, Forbes, Rilling, & Charland, 2011), then no previous tools 
are effective in solving our problem. We are therefore compelled to develop a new model, 
in order to provide the necessary fine granularity for our application scope. A discussion 
on what consists coarse versus fine granularity is given in Section 3.2. 
The proposed framework described in Chapter 3 uses an intermediary form obtained using 
Abstract Syntax Trees by employing Another Tool for Language Recognition (ANTLR), a 
well-established parser generator (Parr & Fisher, 2011).  The result is source code in the 
Semantic Web’s Resource Description Format (RDF) (W3C, 2004) format that allows a 
novel rule-based reasoning implementation that detects Web vulnerabilities independently 
of the input language used. Reasoning using rules to detect Web application vulnerabilities 
is described in Chapter 4. 
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1.4.2. Fine-grained Approach 
In order to explain our second contribution, an example of an insecure implicit 
information-flow follows.  
a = 1; //public variable  
if (b == True) { //private variable  
        a = 2;  
}  
We assume in this example that a is a public variable and b is a private variable. The 
assignment a = 2 gives out publicly the value of b. Specifically, if a changes its value to 
2 or does not change its value; an attacker can infer that the private variable is True, or 
False, respectively. Using static analysis, the a variable needs to be tracked across the 
source code in order to determine if it leaks any private information. A line representation 
of source code, such as the following, would not be sufficient in this case.  
<http://domain.com/project/line/129>  
<http://domain.com/project/hasContent> "a = 2;".  
A suitable representation of source code needs to evaluate any assignments in the code. 
Thus, a fine-grained representation, at variable and assignment level, would provide 
sufficient details to implement methods of information-flow control. For example, the line 
a = 2; represented in RDF using our proposed algorithm results in the following graph: 
_A:1
rdf:
valu
e
:IDENT
rdf
:va
lueEXPR
rdf:value
:DECIMAL_LITERAL
_A:2 _A:3
:ASSIGN
_A:4
=
a
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2
 
Figure 6 Source code assignment expressed in RDF 
Using semantics through an RDF graph, we managed to express the assignment in a way 
that can be understood by machines and reasoned upon; the assignment is expressed by the 
:ASSIGN predicate; the assigned value is a decimal according to the 
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:DECIMAL_LITERAL predicate and its value equals 2. Therefore, our second 
contribution is to offer a method that represents source code facts with the finest 
granularity, suitable for implementing information-flow control. Section 3.2 describes the 
concepts and techniques used for achieving a fine-grained, independent representation of 
source code.  Chapter 3 describes the source code facts extraction framework. 
1.4.3. Detection of Web Application Vulnerabilities through Novel Semantic Web 
Reasoning 
We propose a novel approach to static code analysis that employs Semantic Web 
technologies to convert source code to a common format where reasoning can be applied to 
detect Web application vulnerabilities using rules that describe patterns of code vulnerable 
to security exploits. To the best of our knowledge, a Semantic Web approach to static code 
analysis has not been proposed in the current literature. The methodology that applies 
Semantic Web technologies  to the detection of security vulnerabilities in Web applications 
is described in Chapter 4. 
The reason behind the choice of Semantic Web technologies is threefold. First, policy 
enforcement in the context of security and privacy, leveraging Semantic Web technologies, 
has been previously tested and applied in academia (e.g. Ashri, Payne, Marvin, Surridge, & 
Taylor, 2004; Kagal, Finin, & Joshi, 2003; Rao & Sadeh, 2005; to name just a few). 
Although these frameworks do not apply to software, they do provide a proof of concept 
that security can be enforced with the application of Semantic Web technologies. Second, 
using Semantic Web, computer programs can be published in a language specifically 
designed for data (RDF) and inference capabilities suffice for an implementation of a tool 
that reasons upon data to detect flaws in source code. Third, the Semantic Web offers a 
new dimension to the analysis of code through its inference capability. Therefore, we 
believe that a semantically enhanced static code analysis will allow for applications where 
machines can inference new patterns of vulnerabilities based on rules modelling patterns of 
code. Some examples that prove this concept are given in Sections 4.3 and 5.2.2. 
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1.5. Thesis Organization 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review from 
two different perspectives. First, it describes the various methods for checking the security 
of Web applications. Second, it discusses Semantic Web frameworks applied in the context 
of security, as well as efforts to convert source code to RDF, together with their 
shortcomings in terms of applicability to our problem statement. Chapter 3 describes the 
source code facts extraction framework and the algorithms used for its implementation. 
Chapter 4 presents the method for detecting Web application vulnerabilities using 
Semantic Web technologies and its implementation. Experiments and results are given in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will discuss limitations of the Web vulnerabilities detection 
methodology and of the techniques employed, as well as their impact on the results. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will conclude the thesis, and will propose future work.     
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2. RELATED WORK 
Standard security mechanisms, such as access control, do not prevent private information 
from leaking through computations, since they only control information release, not its 
propagation. For example, access control mechanisms can be used to restrict the execution 
of operations on a file only to the administrator of the system, but have no control over 
what the administrator will do with the information read from the file. Oracle recommends 
where possible, security to be enforced in the database using stored procedures, but this 
implementation is neither modular nor portable. Details of these limitations are given in 
Section 2.1.  
In order to detect flaws in Web applications, a promising solution is statically checking 
information flows within systems that manipulate sensitive data. Both the industry and 
academia offer a variety of static checks implementations, but they either propose new 
scripting languages or are designed to operate only on one specific programming language. 
A discussion of these approaches is given in Section 2.2. The solution proposed in this 
thesis aims to use standardized representation of source code in RDF to overcome these 
limitations. 
Although the Web of Data is steadily increasing (Parundekar, Knoblock, & Ambite, 2012) 
with more than 31 billion triples reported to be stored in the Linked Data Cloud in 2011 
(Kaoudi & Manolescu, 2013), not many source code facts representation services are 
available. The few frameworks available have either limited application (e.g. they convert 
only Java source code) or their representation is high-level, where only metadata and 
descriptions of methods are made available in RDF. Section 2.3 presents these 
frameworks.  
In addition, Section 2.3.5 discusses the frameworks that enforce security policies using 
Semantic Web technologies and their limitations in terms of applicability to this thesis 
context, namely that they apply to different fields than testing data-driven applications. 
2.1. Ad-hoc Mechanisms to Enforce Security 
The traditional way of enforcing security is through ad-hoc mechanisms, such as security 
enforced in the database and context-based solutions. While Oracle recommends that when 
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possible security be enforced using stored procedures, most of the time this does not 
represent the ideal way of preventing certain attacks and thus, other approaches are 
considered. This section aims to show how difficult it is to implement security and 
therefore, how imperative it is to explore ways to detect vulnerabilities in Web 
applications.  
2.1.1. Security Enforced in the Database 
According to Oracle’s security guidelines (Oracle, 2014) there are two questions to 
consider when creating and implementing security for database applications: 
1. Do the application users have database access accounts? 
2. Is it better to enforce security in the application or the database? 
Oracle recommends that where possible, security should be enforced in the database, 
leveraging intrinsic security mechanisms, such as stored procedures and auditing; and that 
security implemented in this way cannot be bypassed. However, in order to enforce 
security mechanisms of the database, the application users must have linked database 
access accounts. 
For many commercial database applications, the application users do not have database 
access accounts. For these applications users connect to the database using a single, highly 
privileged user with database access account; the “One big application user” model 
(Oracle, 2014) is used. 
Apart from commercial applications using the “One big application user” model, enforcing 
security in the database can fail to make an application’s security implementation modular 
or reusable and thus, less portable, since the same application using a different database 
will need a reimplementation of the security policy. 
2.1.2. Context-based Solutions 
Throughout Section 1.2, various forms of attacks and their context-based solutions were 
described. Most attacks are due to insufficient sanitization of input/output data. Different 
sanitization solutions apply to different contexts and evidently, to different programming 
languages, making it very easy for developers to make mistakes and leave room for 
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vulnerabilities (SANS, 2014). When proper sanitization is not in place, vulnerabilities must 
be identified and fixed.  
For example, sanitization of user input is dependent on the context in which the user data is 
used and thus is difficult to be implemented correctly and relevantly. For example, while a 
PHP filter_input function is suitable for sanitizing input that is echoed back to the 
webpage, it would not be suitable for a SQLIA (SQL injection attack), where user input 
sanitization should be implemented using the mysql_real_escape_string() or prepared 
statements and parameter binding. 
Sanitization can also be dependent on the language used. In order to prevent a cross-site 
scripting attack, PHP offers the HTMLPurifier library, while in Java the OWASP Java 
HTML Sanitizer can be employed with similar effects.  
Sometimes, solutions must be chosen based on performance considerations. The 
recommended way to prevent SQL injection attacks is through parameterized queries. 
Unfortunately, this approach can cause performance issues and in this situation, the 
developer might choose to prevent attacks using stored procedures, or through other 
means. 
2.2. Information-flow Control Using Static Code Analysis 
Static analysis complements dynamic analysis by examining the flow of information for all 
execution paths and variables and not just the ones exercised at runtime (Masri, Podgurski, 
& Leon, 2004). This feature of static analysis is particularly useful in assuring a program’s 
security because most security attacks exercise an application in unforeseen and untested 
ways (Intel, 2012). Static analysis is applied offline to assess an application’s compliance 
with an information-flow policy. Although current static analysis systems are efficient at 
finding vulnerabilities (Baca, Carlsson, Petersen, & Lundberg, 2013), their application is 
limited to a specific programming language. This section reviews these systems and 
presents their limitations in terms of applicability. 
2.2.1. Taint Mode 
Malicious users of data-driven applications can try to exploit security weaknesses by 
cleverly crafting data entered through an HTML form. This type of exploit causes the 
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application to behave in unexpected ways, which ultimately leads to leakage of 
confidential data. 
Taint mode (Masri, Podgurski, & Leon, 2004) is a run-time check provided by several 
scripting languages, such as Perl and Ruby. A developer can activate taint mode in order to 
check the logic of CGI scripts. This mode will treat all user input data coming from outside 
the application and used in potentially unsafe operations (e.g. system calls) as tainted, 
unless a developer specifically marks the respective data as safe or applies compiled 
templates to the vulnerable code, i.e. by using prepared statements (OWASP, 2014). Taint 
mode ignores safe operations, such as print. 
SQL injection is one example of tainted data used to execute an attack on a target database. 
The example below illustrates code vulnerable to an SQL injection attack. In this case, the 
Perl programming language is used to insert data into a database. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
my $username = $cgi->param("username"); # Get the name from 
the browser 
... 
$dbh->execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = 
'$username';"); # Execute a SQL query 
 
The $username variable is read from an HTML form and used to retrieve data from a 
database. If an attacker uses the value '; DROP TABLE users;-- for the 
$username variable, then the SQL command becomes SELECT * FROM users 
WHERE username = ''; DROP TABLE users;--. The malicious user added a 
new SQL command with devastating effects: it deletes the entire users table. In order to fix 
this problem, a developer must either sanitize the $username variable or employ prepare 
and execute statements (OWASP, 2014). Because the $username variable is read from 
outside the application and used in a potentially dangerous operation, i.e. accessing a 
database, it cannot be trusted and thus, marked as tainted by the Perl’s taint mode. 
Because Perl’s taint mode is a run-time check, if a variable is marked by Perl’s taint mode 
as tainted, the program running with taint mode will fail with a similar error as the 
following: 
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Insecure dependency in open while running with -T switch at 
./program.pl line 10. 
To be able to run the program, the programmer has to specifically un-taint the variable 
marked as tainted. 
Perl is not the only language that supports taint checking. Taint mode is also a feature of 
the Ruby scripting language. Ruby uses a variable, named $SAFE, to control five security 
levels (Thomas, Fowler, & Hunt, 2004). The security level ranges from level 0, where no 
data is marked as tainted, to level 4, where modification of global data is forbidden. 
Whilst the taint checking method has been proven both effective and efficient at finding 
Web application vulnerabilities (Hurst, 2004), not all scripting languages support this 
mode. Two examples are Python and PHP. Furthermore, taint mode is language dependent, 
i.e. Perl’s taint mode cannot be applied to Python code. Therefore, taint mode does not 
provide a language independent solution for security checking data-driven applications. 
2.2.2. Language-based Information-flow Control 
This section describes various methods of implementing information-flow control 
proposed in academia and it is divided in three parts corresponding to three category types: 
language extension, language runtime and new scripting language. The first part presents 
methods that use language extensions and achieve the control of information-flow 
statically and with little run-time overhead. The second part describes RESIN, a language 
run-time that can be used to track sensitive data that are annotated with a policy object, but 
incurs a 33% CPU overhead for HotCRP
7
, a conference management system. The last part 
presents a completely new proposed scripting language that implements security. The first 
two categories of methods have the limitation that they cannot be applied to existing Web 
systems written in traditional programming languages, without modifications or added 
information regarding security policies. Adopting the last category of methods would 
necessitate rewriting all existing code in the newly proposed scripting language. 
                                                          
7
 http://read.seas.harvard.edu/~kohler/hotcrp/ 
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Language Extension 
In academia, researchers have implemented languages or extensions that support 
information flow policies. Myers (1999) and Simonet & Rocquencourt (2003) proposed 
extensions of existing programming languages, Java and Objective Caml, respectively. 
Both proposed approaches use type systems to annotate data and statically check that every 
information flow is legal concerning a security policy. 
Myers (1999) describes JFlow, a new language that extends the Java programming 
language developed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data mostly 
using statically checked data flow assertions. JFlow’s goal is to prevent sensitive 
information from being leaked through computation and it achieves this using 
decentralized label modeling (DLM). JFlow uses static checking, allowing a detailed 
tracking of security classes without incurring run-time overhead. The author provides 
programmers with a JFlow compiler that will statically check programs written in JFlow. 
Furthermore, JFlow supports the development of secure applets and servers that handle 
sensitive data. 
class passwordFile authority(root) { 
public boolean 
check (String user, String password) 
where authority(root) { 
// Return whether password is correct 
boolean match = false; 
try { 
for (int i = 0; i < names.length; i++) { 
if (names[i] == user && 
passwords[i] == password) { 
match = true; 
break; 
} 
} 
} 
catch (NullPointerException e) {} 
catch (IndexOutOfBoundsException e) {} 
return declassify(match, {user; password}); 
} 
private String [ ] names; 
private String { root: } [ ] passwords; 
} 
 
Listing 1 A JFlow password file (Myers, 1999)  
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Although JFlow addressed some of the limitations of previous proposed approaches, (e.g. 
mutable objects, subclassing, exceptions) programmers are required to write applications 
in the JFlow language. Listing 1 shows an example of JFlow code that protects passwords 
using information flow controls. The method check accepts two arguments, a username 
and a password and returns a boolean value that indicates whether the password is a 
match for the username. Declassification is used for practicality reasons in order to relax 
policies owned by principals, as strict information-flow control is too restrictive to write 
real applications. The method check is executed with the root authority, which has the 
ability to declassify data. 
The authors write that due to checking being done statically, there is little run-time 
overhead. Although the JFlow annotations are used only in situations where security issues 
may arise, and only three annotations were required to prevent leakage of information in 
the example from Listing 1, the proposed approach cannot be applied to traditional 
scripting languages such as PHP, Python or Perl, used in the development of Web 
information systems.  
Flow Caml (Simonet & Rocquencourt, 2003) is an extension of the Objective Caml 
language that introduces a type system to trace information-flow control. Flow Caml first 
checks for information leaks using static code analysis and then translates the program 
under inspection to regular Objective Caml producing code that is safe from Web 
application attacks. Flow Caml ensures security by assigning policies to variables and 
expressions. For example, to assign a policy and a value to a variable in Flow Caml, the 
programmer can use the following expression: let x1 : !alice int = 42;; 
thus the integer x1 has level !alice. The x1 integer can legally be stored in r1: 
r1 := x1;; 
Furthermore, an integer x2 is declared with the level !bob. A rule is defined to forbid 
an information flow from !bob to !alice, and thus assigning it to r1 raises a typing 
error: 
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r1 := x2;; 
This expression generates the following information flow(s): 
from !bob to !alice 
which are not legal. (Simonet & Rocquencourt, 2003) 
 
Flow Caml’s default security policy does not allow information to flow from one principal 
to another, where stdout and alice are principals. However, information flow 
constraints can be redefined using the flow keyword and resulting in a security policy 
relaxation. In this case, the assertion flow !alice < !stdout;; would allow 
information to flow from the principal alice to stdout and thus, printed to standard 
output. 
A few differences exist in the way these proposed extensions implement security. 
Simonet’s Flow Caml features polymorphism and a full type inference algorithm, while 
Myers’ JFlow uses monomorphic types and must fully annotate, including their security 
level, the arguments of methods. Although both approaches are successful at checking that 
a program is obeying a security policy, they both require existing systems to be rewritten 
using the proposed languages and the added extensions, which make them infeasible to be 
applied to already developed Web systems in popular scripting languages, such as PHP, 
Python and Perl. 
Language Runtime 
Yip et al. (2009) introduced a new language runtime called RESIN that prevents security 
vulnerabilities using three concepts: policy objects, data tracking and filter objects. 
Developers of applications must specify the policy and filter objects in the application’s 
programming language. At runtime, RESIN will track sensitive data annotated with a 
policy object and will not allow this data to cross a boundary defined in a filter object. 
For example, to track passwords in programs written in the PHP programming language, 
programmers will use RESIN concepts to annotate the passwords with policy objects, 
similar to the one in Listing 2. If RESIN catches any inappropriate disclosure of passwords 
annotated with such policy, it will throw an exception. The runtime is a modified 
interpreter of the PHP language causing CPU overhead.  
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class PasswordPolicy extends Policy { 
private $email; 
function __construct($email) { 
$this->email = $email; 
} 
function export_check($context) { 
if ($context[’type’] == ’email’ && 
                $context[’email’] == $this->email) return; 
global $Me; 
if ($context[’type’] == ’http’ && 
$Me->privChair) return; 
throw new Exception(’unauthorized disclosure’); 
} 
} 
 
policy_add($password, new PasswordPolicy(’u@foo.com’)); 
Listing 2 "Simpliﬁed PHP code for deﬁning the HotCRP password policy class and annotating the password 
data. This policy only allows a password to be disclosed to the user’s own email address or to the 
program chair." (Yip, Wang, Zeldovich, & Kaashoek, 2009) 
Although RESIN is effective at preventing a series of common attacks, it does not use 
static checks of code. RESIN is not a method employed to verify that the code is written 
with safety in mind, but a mechanism that prevents leakage of confidential data by 
applications that contain vulnerable code. Furthermore, RESIN adds extra overhead in 
terms of application processing time (i.e. it adds 33% CPU over-head when generating a 
page for a conference management software). Programmers are still faced with the 
challenge of learning new concepts, writing policy objects, data flow assertions and filter 
objects, although the specifications are expressed using existing programming languages. 
New Scripting Language 
Others propose completely new Web scripting languages to enforce confidentiality and 
integrity of data. For example, Li (2005) and Zdancewic (2005) introduced a domain-
specific Web scripting language designed for interfacing with databases. Their rationale 
behind this approach includes the implementation of DBMS stored procedures as not 
modular, nor reusable, and taint mode as only an ad-hoc mechanism. Li’s proposed Web 
scripting language is similar to PHP.  
Li’s scripting language uses strongly typed queries to the application’s underlying database 
to prevent security violations. Listing 3 shows an example of a Web script written in the 
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newly proposed scripting language. It implements two query interfaces to enable 
interaction with the database.  
<?ssp_header 
     FormInputs ("UserName" => u, "Password" => p, "QueryYear" => y); 
 
     Query GetID ( username: !tainted ) => ( 
          PASSWORD : {this=*}, 
      ID : {if (PASSWORD=*) this 0} 
      ); 
 
     Query FetchRecords( index: !untainted, year:!{Integer(*)} ) => ( 
   ORDERID : public, 
            AMOUNT : public, 
            CCNUM : {tailstr(this,4)} 
      ); 
 
      Variables ( pub_id: public!untainted ); 
 !ssp_header> 
 <html><head><title>....</title> 
 <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8"> 
 </head><body> 
 ...... 
 <?ssp 
       q1 := query GetID(u); 
       if ( empty(q1) ) { 
         print 'Unknown username'; 
       } else { 
             (pwd, id) := readrow(q1); 
             L_AUTH: if (pwd=p) 
             { 
     print 'Username = '; print u; 
                   pub_id := declassify(id, L_AUTH:(pwd=*)); 
                   print 'School ID ='; print pub_id; 
                   q2 := query FetchRecords( pub_id, Integer(y) ); 
                   while (!empty(q2)) { 
           (orderid, amount, ccnum) := readrow(q2); 
      print 'Order ID = '; print orderid; 
           print 'Amount = '; print amount; 
      print 'Credit Card = XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-'; 
      print tailstr(ccnum, 4); 
    } 
   } else { 
    print 'Wrong password'; 
   } 
  } 
 !ssp> 
Listing 3 Web script example of Li’s proposed language (Li, 2005) 
It reads the username and password as input, fetches records from the database and 
displays results. Public, tainted data coming from outside the application is marked with 
the “public ! tainted” security level and thus considered untrusted by the 
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application. Using the security level “!untainted”, Li’s scripting language can 
prevent passing tainted data to the index variable, marked using this security level (e.g. 
index: !untainted). Moreover, the argument year in the FetchRecords query, 
can only be of type integer, achieved by converting data received as a string to an 
integer. This type of enforcement can stop certain SQL injection attacks, as it does not 
allow reading strings that can be used as SQL queries. 
Although the proposed Web scripting language provides strong enforcement of 
confidentiality and integrity policies, it is a completely new scripting language. This makes 
it infeasible to be applied to existing systems written in popular programming languages. 
2.2.3. Java Bytecode Analysis 
Some research only focusses on testing the security of the Java programming language 
(Graf, Hecker, & Mohr, 2013; Hammer, 2010 and Barthe, Pichardie, & Rezk, 2007) due to 
its popularity. 
Hammer (2010) uses system dependence graphs (SDG) to represent the semantics of a 
Java program and their major contribution is the implementation of the first dependence-
graph-based information-flow control application for full Java bytecode, including taking 
into account exceptions, constructors, or unstructured control flow. The validation of the 
code is achieved through graph traversal in the style of program slicing and according to 
the non-interference security policy, assures that no secret data is leaked to unauthorized 
users of the system. Program slicing considers statements that carry information used in 
the statement that is being analyzed for security compliance. A statement’s (backward) 
slice contains all the statements that might semantically influence the statement under 
inspection. Using this method, the author reduced the annotation burden associated with 
type systems, such as those presented in Section 2.2.2. 
Based on the above work, Graf, Hecker, & Mohr (2013) developed more recent work on an 
information-flow control method for Java bytecode. Their solution is also based on SDGs, 
but with a focus on practicality. The authors state that in contrast with other theoretical 
methods, their approach is the first tool that can check for both possible and probable 
information flow leaks. Their proposed approach can deal with sequential and multi-
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threaded medium sized programs, in some cases, up to 100kLoC (lines of code). One of 
their contributions is a user interface of their IFC framework (Information-Flow Control), 
named IFC console, used to analyze information flow. 
Barthe, Pichardie, & Rezk (2007) propose an information-flow control method operating 
on Java bytecode as well. They handle the unstructured nature of bytecode programs 
caused by jumps and exceptions using three successive phases. A PA (pre-analyzer) phase 
detects branches that will never be taken. A CDR (control dependence regions) analyzer 
reduces the size of the control graph by eliminating the branches found in the PA phase. 
Lastly, an IF (information flow) analyzer verifies the correctness of the program according 
to the non-interference policy. 
Table 1 Most popular websites and their server-side languages ( Rossum, 2006; Hoff, 2008; Campbell, 
2010) 
Website Popularity (unique 
visitors) 
Server-side language 
Google.com 1,000,000,000 C, C++, Go, Java, Python, 
PHP 
Facebook.com 880,000,000 PHP, C++, Java, Python, 
FBML, Ajax, Erlang, D, Xhp 
YouTube.com 800,000,000 C, Python, Java 
Yahoo 590,000,000 PHP 
Live.com 490,000,000 ASP.NET 
MSN.com 440,000,000 ASP.NET 
Wikipedia.org 410,000,000 PHP 
Blogger 340,000,000 Python 
Bing 230,000,000 ASP.NET 
Twitter.com 160,000,000 C++, Java, Scala, Ruby on 
Rails 
The methods presented in this section have a common limitation; they only apply to Java 
bytecode. Although these approaches offer promising results, other programming 
languages need to be considered. Google released a list of the top 1000 visited websites in 
the world
8
. Part of this list is illustrated in Table 1, which includes the first 10 websites, 
their popularity and the server-side programming language used for implementation. This 
                                                          
8
 http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top1000/ 
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table shows that although Java and PHP seem to be more popular, a substantial number of 
websites are implemented using different languages. 
Note that Java, PHP and Python are the most common used languages, but others, such as 
ASP.NET and C are also used in website development. Because industries employ many 
other programming languages than Java, approaches should consider a uniform way of 
securing code independently of the underlying code syntax. 
2.3. Semantic Web Concepts and Practices 
The Semantic Web is the grand vision of machines understanding the meaning of 
information and rests on the theory that this can be achieved by accommodating semantics 
of Web data (Gruber, 2008). While critics speculated the Semantic Web vision to be 
infeasible (Richardson, Agrawal, & Domingos, 2003), advocates validated the original 
concept with applications in industry, biology and human science (Feigenbaum, Herman, 
Hongsermeier, Neumann, & Stephens, 2007). Typically, data from various sources is 
represented as triples in the Resource Description Framework (RDF) format with the 
purpose of being uniformly queried by machines in order to solve a specific problem or 
answer a specific question (Arenas & Perez, 2011). In this paper, we apply RDF to static 
code analysis. 
Semantic Web technologies can provide a solution to the limitations of existing 
information-flow control using the static analysis methods presented in Section 2.2. Using 
Semantic Web technologies, programming code can be exported to a common format, 
where reasoning using rules and inference engines can be uniformly implemented 
independently of the input language. This research aims to implement a method that finds 
Web application vulnerabilities for any existing Web system, regardless of the chosen 
language for its development. In this approach, new languages can be supported by 
implementing a translator to the common format: the existing analysis engine can then be 
applied without modification. 
This section reviews different technologies that the Semantic Web offers starting with an 
introduction on vocabularies and the Resource Description Framework (RDF) data model, 
which the Semantic Web builds upon. A Semantic Web framework with flexible inference 
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mechanisms will be described in Section 2.3.3. This framework will be used by the 
analysis method described in Chapter 4. For the sake of clarity, Section 2.3.3 will also 
describe how reasoning with rules works. Section 2.3.4 continues with presentation of 
current methods that extract source code facts and represent them with RDF, as well as 
their limitations. Section 2.3.5 will finish with the presentation of existing frameworks that 
use Semantic Web technologies to apply security concepts. Although these frameworks 
apply in a different context than static analysis of source code, they demonstrate that 
Semantic Web reasoning and RDF can be successfully employed to implement security. 
2.3.1. Vocabularies 
Vocabularies (W3C, 2013) are used on the Semantic Web to define concepts and 
relationships of a domain of interest. Relationships are also called “terms”. If vocabularies 
are complex, containing several thousands of terms, they are usually referred to as 
ontologies. 
Vocabularies are commonly used to enable applications that use data integration for 
solving problems. An example is the use of vocabularies to describe pharmaceutical 
products and patient data. Integrating the knowledge from both vocabularies and using 
Semantic Web technologies, decision support systems can be developed that can 
automatically prescribe treatments for patients. 
In order to represent source code in the RDF format, as well as reasoning on top of the 
RDF data, we used two vocabularies: the RDF concepts vocabulary (RDF) and Flow 
Control (FC). Note that vocabularies are abbreviated using capital letters, but when used to 
represent data in the RDF format, the abbreviation uses lower case letters. The purpose of 
existing vocabularies is to offer concepts and relationships that are only useful for 
representing certain data, but that can be also reused by other applications. The RDF 
concepts vocabulary (RDF) was chosen to represent some relationships. The RDF 
vocabulary provides a couple of terms that can be used by the proposed methodology to 
create anonymous nodes (rdf:parseType Resource) and to assign values to nodes 
(rdf:value). More information about the use of these terms is given in Chapter 3. 
Although the authors of the RDF vocabulary chose the same abbreviation as the format 
itself (i.e. RDF); it should be clear from the context in which it appears, whether RDF is 
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used as a vocabulary rather than the format for representing data. Flow Control (FC) is a 
vocabulary created for the purpose of this research, in order to represent concepts such as 
fc:assign, fc:number, fc:variable, in the source code representation realm.  
The concepts and relationships for representing source code facts necessary for the 
development of this research are derived from the grammar of a programming language. 
Grammars are explained in Section 3.2.2. For example, if the source code facts extraction 
framework described in Chapter 3 extracts source code facts from a PHP program, then the 
FC vocabulary’s concepts and relationships are derived from the description of the PHP 
grammar. More details are given in Chapter 3. To the best of our knowledge, vocabularies 
that are derived from the grammars used by the proposed methodology do not exist.   
Vocabularies have namespaces that are unique on the Web. For example, the RDF 
vocabulary can be accessed at http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#. 
Unique namespaces are necessary to avoid name conflicts. For example, the term lift 
can be used as both a verb and a noun and can be a member of two vocabularies. One 
vocabulary might describe a building and use this term to represent data about an elevator. 
Another vocabulary could be a representation of a body builder’s activities and thus, lift 
could be used to describe the action of lifting weights.  
A unique URI was used for the source code facts namespace: 
http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol. It should be noted that this unique URI 
was not necessary, as the source code facts data represented in RDF are not published on 
the Web and therefore there is no risk of name conflicts. However, for the sake of 
compliance with the Semantic Web vision and for future work that might involve 
publishing or linking data on the Web, a unique URI was created. Furthermore, the FC 
vocabulary has no contents as the concepts and relationships are created on the fly, derived 
from the description of the language grammar. Future work that involves publishing data 
should include creating a vocabulary for the source code facts representation, in order for 
source code represented in RDF to have meaning for machines crawling or reasoning on 
the Web. For the proposed methodology, this step was not necessary, as work is done 
internally.  
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2.3.2. RDF Data Model 
RDF (W3C, 2004) is a W3C recommendation and a specification for defining information 
on the Web. RDF supports the Extensible Markup Language (XML) syntax and it is used 
to make statements about Web resources represented by Universal Resource Identifiers 
(URIs).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
The underlying structure of an RDF statement is a directed graph representing triples in the 
form of subject-predicate-object. For example, the RDF graph in Figure 7 makes the 
following statements: “A document with the URI fc:ApplicationSecurity  has the 
title ‘Finding vulnerabilities through the SW’. The author of this document is a person and 
her name is ‘Oana Ureche’”. RDF can use a blank node (also called an anonymous node or 
bnode) to create a statement. A blank node represents a resource for which there is no URI 
or literal. 
The meaning of the predicates, subjects and objects is given by the vocabularies used: 
Dublin Core
9
 (DC), RDF concepts, Friend of a Friend (FOAF) and lastly, Flow Control
10
 
(FC).  
Commonly, two RDF serialization formats are used: RDF/XML
11
 and Notation 3
12
 (N3). 
Listing 4 and Listing 5 describe the RDF graph from Figure 7, using these serialization 
                                                          
9
 http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ 
10
 http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/ 
11
 http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-syntax-grammar/ 
12
 http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/Primer 
foaf:name 
dc:author 
rdf:type 
fc:ApplicationSecurity 
dc:title 
“Finding 
vulnerabilities 
through the SW” 
 
foaf:Person “Oana Ureche” 
bnode 
Figure 7 Example of an RDF graph 
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formats. N3 was proposed as an alternative to the RDF/XML serialization, due to its 
readability and the ease of writing RDF statements. 
<?xml version=”1.1”?> 
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf=”http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#” 
         xmlns:foaf=”http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/” 
         xmlns:dc=”http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/” 
         xmlns:fc=”http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/”> 
<rdf:Description rdf:about=”fc:ApplicationSecurity”> 
  <dc:title>Finding vulnerabilities through the SW</dc:title> 
     <dc:author> 
       <rdf:Description foaf:name=”Oana Ureche”> 
    <rdf:type   
          rdf:resource=”http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/Person/”/> 
  </rdf:Description> 
     </dc:author> 
</rdf:Description> 
</rdf:RDF> 
Listing 4 Representation of RDF statements using RDF/XML 
 
@prefix rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> . 
@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> . 
@prefix dc: <http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/> . 
@prefix fc: <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/> . 
 
<fc:ApplicationSecurity> dc:author _:b1; 
 dc:title “Finding vulnerabilities through the SW” . 
_:b1 a <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/Person/>; 
 foaf:name “Oana Ureche” .  
Listing 5 Representation of RDF statements using N3 
As previously mentioned, a blank node represents a resource for which there is no URI or 
literal. It can serve as a parent node to a grouping of data. Such nodes can be observed in 
the graph as well as in the two different serialization formats. In the statement  
<fc:ApplicationSecurity> dc:author _:b1;  
the _:b1 node is the blank node. Notation 3 uses the _: namespace to identify blank 
nodes. There is no commitment to the chosen name b1, but it has to be consistent 
throughout the RDF serialization to identify statements that have the node :_b1 in 
common. When writing Jena rules to infer statements, the ? symbol is used to identify 
blank nodes. Rules and inference mechanisms are discussed in the next section. 
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2.3.3. Reasoning with Jena Rules 
Jena is a leading Semantic Web toolkit for Java programmers (Carroll, et al., 2004). The 
open source Jena framework provides Java libraries for flexible inference using Semantic 
Web technologies. It is important to describe this framework, as it will constitute the 
programming toolkit for the methodology implementation phase described in Chapter 4. 
Jena was chosen as it is the most widespread Semantic Web framework (Lindorfer, 2010) 
and it is sufficient for this project. While there are other frameworks, it falls out of the 
scope of this research to analyze which framework is the most productive or usable. 
The Jena machinery is designed to be used for general inference purposes and it includes a 
generic rule engine that supports user-defined rules. By Jena definition, the term inference 
represents the action of deriving additional information, while reasoner refers to the code 
function that performs the inference task.  
Rule :=   bare-rule . 
          or   [ bare-rule ] 
          or   [ ruleName : bare-rule ] 
 
bare-rule :=   term, ... term -> hterm, ... hterm    // forward rule 
          or   bhterm <- term, ... term              // backward rule 
 
hterm     :=   term 
          or   [ bare-rule ] 
 
term      :=   (node, node, node)       // triple pattern 
          or   (node, node, functor)    // extended triple pattern 
          or   builtin(node, ... node)  // invoke procedural primitive 
 
bhterm      :=   (node, node, node)     // triple pattern 
 
functor   :=   functorName(node, ... node)  // structured literal 
 
node      :=   uri-ref            // e.g. http://foo.com/eg 
          or   prefix:localname   // e.g. rdf:type 
          or   <uri-ref>          // e.g. <myscheme:myuri> 
          or   ?varname           // variable 
          or   'a literal'        // a plain string literal 
          or   'lex'^^typeURI     // a typed literal 
          or   number             // e.g. 42 or 25.5 
Listing 6 Definition of Jena rules
13 
Listing 6 shows the description of Jena rules syntax. There are two parts to a rule: the If 
clause and the Then clause. The rules written throughout the proposed methodology use 
                                                          
13
 http://jena.apache.org/documentation/inference/ 
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the forward chaining method. Forward chaining starts with available data and infers new 
data when the antecedent (If clause) is met. Using the forward chaining method an 
inference engine will look for statements that match the antecedent and, when found, the 
consequent (Then clause) is inferred. 
Commonly, applications that access the Jena inference machinery use the ModelFactory 
class to associate a data set with some reasoner, in order to create a new InfModel.  The 
example in Listing 7 illustrates this process. It uses a generic rule reasoner to programmer-
defined rules. The new resulting model (e.g. InfModel inf) can be queried for data. 
Statements that already existed in the original dataset will be found together with new 
inferred statements resulting from the application of programmer-defined rules.  
String rules = "[rule1: (?a :hasFather ?b) (?b :hasBrother ?c) ->  
         (?a :hasUncle ?c)]"; 
Reasoner reasoner = new GenericRuleReasoner(Rule.parseRules(rules)); 
InfModel inf = ModelFactory.createInfModel(reasoner, rawData); 
Listing 7 Inference with generic rule reasoner 
Consider the raw data as the statements in Listing 8 together with the rule that defines what 
it means to be an uncle. After applying reasoning in the form of the code from Listing 7, 
the inferred statement will be :John :hasUncle :James . When queried for 
statements, the new model (e.g. InfModel inf) will return three statements, the original 
two statements and the inferred statement. 
@prefix : <http://namespaceexample.org/> 
:John :hasFather :Jim . 
:Jim :hasBrother :James . 
{ ?a :hasFather ?b . ?b :hasBrother ?c . } -> { ?a :hasUncle ?c } . 
Listing 8 Raw data and rule defining what it means to be an uncle 
This section briefly presented the syntax of a Jena rule and a small reasoning example. 
Anonymous nodes were discussed in the previous section. Although these examples are 
simplistic, these concepts will be applied in the vulnerability detection method described in 
Chapter 4. 
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2.3.4. Representation of Source Code Triples 
A few Semantic Web frameworks to extract source code facts exist for different purposes. 
This section presents these frameworks and describes their shortcomings in terms of our 
application scope. 
Ganapathy and Sagayaraj (2011) proposed a framework that extracts Java source code 
metadata and stores it in the OWL (Web Ontology Language) using the Jena framework, 
briefly described in Section 2.3.3. The metadata extraction process is achieved using 
QDox
14
, a parser for extracting definitions of classes, interfaces and methods from Java 
source code files.  Their motivation was driven by the fact that organizations spend a lot of 
time re-doing the same work that had been done already, work that had already been 
tested. Their goal was to help organizations in reusing existing code, and thus, to reduce 
their production time. Using the proposed framework, developers can search for methods 
using parameters that match the metadata stored in the OWL. Once a method is found, the 
source code corresponding to the respective method is retrieved from a Hadoop Distributed 
File System (HDFS) repository. 
The limitation of this framework is that it only stores high-level source code facts in the 
OWL, such as function, definition, type, arguments, brief description, author etc. The code 
inside a method is only stored intact in a HDFS repository for future retrieval. Therefore, 
we cannot perform a data-flow analysis on the resulting dataset of the proposed 
framework. 
Keivanloo et al. (2011) was concerned with two research challenges identified in (W3C, 
2004): 1) design an ontology for source code ecosystems, covering a wide range of 
aspects, such as revisions, presentation, syntax and semantics; and 2) create a generation 
schema to uniquely identify source code entities. They embedded the implementation of 
these two requirements into a Linked Data publication framework (SeCOLD) that provides 
access to 1.5 billion triples of source code data. Software engineering researchers and 
practitioners can use this data for mining, searching and analysis purposes. 
                                                          
14
 http://qdox.codehaus.org/index.html 
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The resulting datasets, with respect to the granularity of the source code facts, have a 
coarse granularity that does not go deeper than the source code line level. For example, 
consider the following Java code, where 128, 129 and 130 are the line numbers: 
128    public void printData() { 
129             System.out.println(this.data); 
130      } 
The SeCOLD framework would express the line with number 129 using the following 
triple. Note that the line content is not dissected any further. Therefore, this coarse 
granularity does not allow information-flow control, where the information regarding the 
flow of a variable is imperative. For example, if data were modified using a side channel, it 
would not be observed. Because the proposed model covers only high-level aspects of 
source code it does not meet our requirements in terms of granularity. 
<http://domain.com/secold/resource/line/project_link/129> 
<http://domain.com/ontologies/2010/11/socon/hasContent>     
"System.out.println(this.data);" . 
Furthermore, the framework only applies to Java source code, because the authors did not 
include source code facts extraction methods for other programming languages. This also 
makes this framework unsuitable for our purposes. 
As no other Semantic Web framework solutions exist for source code representation 
(Keivanloo, Forbes, Rilling, & Charland, 2011), then no previous tools are effective at 
solving our problem. We are therefore compelled to develop a new model, in order to 
provide the necessary fine granularity for our application scope. 
2.3.5. Enforcing Security and Privacy Using Semantic Web Reasoning 
Policy enforcement in the context of security and privacy, leveraging Semantic Web 
technologies, has been previously tested and applied in academia (e.g. Ashri et al., 2004; 
Kagal, Finin & Joshi, 2003; Rao & Sadeh, 2005; to name just a few). Particularly, in (Rao 
& Sadeh, 2005) the authors implemented a Semantic Web framework and a meta-control 
model to control service discovery and access of information using Policy Enforcing 
Agents. Rao and Sadeh are concerned with the issue of enforcing security and privacy 
policies in pervasive computing environments. Apart from enforcing access of data, a 
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particular type of PEA, namely an Information Disclosure Agent (IDA) is responsible for 
enforcing obfuscation policies concerning the accuracy or inaccuracy of the released data. 
The framework exercises several Semantic Web concepts. First, it uses OWL-S (W3C, 
2004) to advertise service profiles modeling sources of information. Second, services have 
owners that set their policies using rules, translated into CLIPS using XSLT. Third, rules 
related to ontologies are expressed using ROWL (Gandon & Sadeh, 2004). Finally, the 
IDA is implemented in JESS, one of the fastest rule engines available
15
. 
Similar to Rao and Sadeh’s work, Kagal, Finin and Joshi (2003) used OWL-S to describe 
Semantic Web services and implemented an algorithm to check their policy compliance. 
The purpose of the work was to handle users’ private information by using Web services 
that reason about their users’ policies. Two kinds of policies are used. Privacy policies 
specify how private information is accessed (e.g. under what conditions). Authorization 
policies specify who can access the private information. In order to write the policies, the 
authors used Rei
16
, a policy specification language.  
Ashri et al. (2004) argue that in order to be able to provide dynamic and adaptive network 
security, conventional security mechanisms need to be combined with the openness and 
expressive power associated with Semantic Web technologies. Their research uses 
semantic reasoning to implement a security device, termed a Semantic Firewall. The 
Semantic Firewall would provide a safe environment supporting autonomous systems and 
their interactions without direct user intervention. Leveraging semantic reasoning allows 
services from different organization to safely communicate using information from 
security requirements and capabilities attached to each service. This information can allow 
or disallow interaction based on the security data associated with the service. 
In this section, we have shown that reasoning with rules and ontologies in order to enforce 
security and integrity of information has been previously proposed in academia. Although 
these frameworks do not apply to source code analysis, they do provide the proof of 
concept that security can be enforced with the application of Semantic Web technologies. 
                                                          
15
 http://www.jessrules.com/ 
16
 http://rei.umbc.edu/ 
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3. SOURCE CODE FACTS EXTRACTION FRAMEWORK 
This chapter gives a description of the proposed source code facts extraction framework. 
Section 3.1 gives an overview of the framework and the chapter continues with detailed 
descriptions of the components involved in the framework.   
3.1. Framework Overview 
Section 2.3.4 contained a few examples of academic efforts to extract source code facts 
from programming code, but their limitations included a coarse-grained approach or their 
method only applied to one programming language (Java). While the Java language is 
popular, Section 2.2.3 demonstrated that other programming languages are extensively 
used by popular websites and thus, the focus should be on a uniform method to extract 
source code facts independently of the input language.  
As part of this research, the aim is to offer a service that represents source code within a 
common format, where reasoning can be achieved, in terms of assuring code security. 
Therefore, two challenges were identified, which are also part of the thesis contributions, 
presented in Section 1.4.  
1) Uniform static code analysis: to develop a framework that converts source code to 
RDF independently of the input language 
2) Fine-grained approach: to extract source code facts with enough detail for 
enforcing security policies through the information-flow control 
The challenge to provide a solution independent of the programming language results in 
the need to keep input data and business logic separate. Thus, we employed APIs from the 
ANTLR
17
 (Another Tool for Language Recognition) library to parse external sources with 
their own specific syntax. Specifically, ANTLR allows for adapting the interface between 
the source code and the language grammar without changing the implementation. Because 
we separate the source code language from the reasoning part, using an independent syntax 
for the latter, we further prevent coupling. Figure 8 shows the translation process using the 
ANTLR parser generator and an XQuery processor. The translation process has two 
phases: a language specific phase and language independent phase. 
                                                          
17
 http://www.antlr.org/   
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Figure 8 Source code facts extraction framework; allows for static code analysis 
The language specific phase uses data specific to the programming language given as input 
(e.g. the source code and its language grammar) and transforms the input into an 
independent form. We mentioned that the representation of source code must be of the 
finest level of detail in order to allow the implementation of information-flow control 
methods. Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) are used to provide the lowest level of detail 
through nodes and edges (Appel & Ginsburg, 1998) containing information about the 
source program in a tree-like structure (Zou & Kontogiannis, 2001). ASTs achieve this 
using lexers and parsers that match symbols from the language grammar with the source 
program given as input and attach semantics to the matched symbols. 
The language independent phase receives as input an AST. This second phase’s process 
maps the AST into a form that allows static code analysis using Semantic Web reasoning. 
Our framework uses XML as an intermediary between an AST and source code 
represented in RDF. First, similar to an AST, an XML document provides a representation 
of data in a tree manner using nodes and edges to encode relationships (attributes) between 
objects. Second, XML can be transformed into RDF using an XQuery processor. We used 
49 
 
a standardized open source Saxon XQuery processor
18
. It provides the functionality needed 
for the proposed methodology and it is available for Java, therefore easy to integrate into 
our implementation. 
3.2. Independent Fine-grained Representation 
One of the challenges encountered during this research, which is also one of the 
contributions of this thesis is the representation of source code facts independently of the 
input language used by a Web system susceptible to attacks. Another challenge and 
contribution is that this representation should be suitable for further information-flow 
control method implementation. That is, it should be fine-grained. The contributions were 
presented in Section 1.4.  The need for a fine-grained approach was explained in Section 
1.4.2. To summarize, a source code fact such as “a = 2” needs to be broken down into 
three units “a”, “=”, “2” to allow for static code analysis. Section 2.3.4 described a 
few frameworks that extract source code facts, but their limitation is that their extraction is 
coarse-grained, such as this above example, or even coarser, by only extracting metadata. 
3.2.1. Abstract and Concrete Syntax Trees 
Abstract Syntax Trees (ASTs) are used to provide the lowest level of detail through nodes 
and edges (Appel & Ginsburg, 1998) containing information about the source program in a 
tree-like structure (Zou & Kontogiannis, 2001). ASTs achieve this using lexers and parsers 
that match symbols from the language grammar with the source program given as input 
and attach semantics to the matched symbols. More information about lexers and parsers 
can be found in Section 3.2.3. Abstract Syntax Trees are widely used by compilers due to 
their ability of representing source code structure (Aho, Lam, Sethi, & Ullman, 2006). 
Eclipse
19
 is one program that uses ASTs, not only for compiling purposes, but also for 
tracking function and variable names throughout the project package. 
In (Aho, Lam, Sethi, & Ullman, 2006) the authors used ASTs as a starting point in 
designing a translator. In an AST, interior nodes represent operators and the children of the 
nodes represent operands. For the tree in Figure 9 the + is the root and the operator, while 
the union 8-4 and 1 are operands. Leveraging the same concepts, in the expression 8-4, 
                                                          
18
 http://saxon.sourceforge.net/   
19
 http://www.eclipse.org/ 
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- represents an operator, while 8 and 4 are operands. In general, to represent a 
programming construct using ASTs, an operator for the constructor is created and the 
operands are represented by the semantically meaningful components of that construct. 
The order of the operators and operands is preserved in an AST tree by reading the tree 
using an in in-order traversal algorithm. However, if we are trying to match the pattern a 
= b + c, in order to trace the variable c,  then the pattern will match the variable b also 
as a variable  to trace. Therefore, the second match results in a false positive. These false 
positives are described in Section 5.1.1. 
+
- 1
8 4
 
Figure 9 Abstract Syntax Tree for 8 – 4 + 1 
As opposed to an AST where interior nodes represent programming constructs, in a 
Concrete Syntax Tree (CST), or a parse tree, the interior nodes represent nonterminals 
(Ranta, 2012). Nonterminals can many times be programming constructs, but they can be 
also represented by “helpers”, such as semicolons, parenthesis etc. These “helpers” have 
been dropped in the building of an AST, as they are not needed for analysing. Therefore, 
the syntactic clutter is removed from the parse tree by discarding all the information that is 
necessary for parsing the code, but irrelevant for static code analysis. This research uses 
ASTs to represent source code without the syntactic clutter that is irrelevant for static code 
analysis. 
An AST for the Java code line return a + 2; will produce the AST from Figure 10 as 
generated by this thesis’ proposed methodology algorithm.  
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Return: ‘return’ PLUS: ‘+’
IDENT: ‘a’
DECIMAL_LITERAL: ‘2’
 
Figure 10 Generated AST for Java code return a + 2; 
Figure 10 shows that unnecessary syntax for analysis of code has been omitted from the 
generated tree (e.g. the semicolon), while the line of code was broken into four parts, each 
enhanced with semantics and generating a fine-grained result to allow for static code 
analysis. 
To generate an AST from programming code, the ANTLR library was employed. A brief 
introduction of the ANTLR library was given in Section 3.1. The reason for using a parser 
generator library was also mentioned in Section 3.1 and it is driven by the need to keep the 
input data and business logic separate. Due to its ability to parse external sources with their 
own specific syntax and to generate ASTs, ANTLR can transform input into an 
independent form, used later by the methodology for uniform reasoning. 
Thus, the methodology uses ANTLR and ASTs to transform programming code into a 
form independent from the input syntax. This output is detailed enough to allow for 
uniform static code analysis. 
3.2.2. Language Grammar 
Language description files, also called language grammars, are available from the ANTLR 
website’s grammar list20. A comprehensive list includes grammars for Java, PHP, C#, 
Pascal and many other programming languages. The methodology uses grammars from 
this list and the ANTLR APIs to generate lexers and parsers for building and traversing 
ASTs. Lexers and parsers will be discussed in the next section. An example of a PHP 
grammar file is given in the APPENDIX. 
                                                          
20
 http://www.antlr3.org/grammar/list.html 
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To generate a parser that outputs an AST from a grammar, the methodology includes the 
command output = AST; inside the options section of the grammar file. 
It should be noted that the contents of grammar files are changeable. Although there was 
flexibility in changing contents of grammar files, which may have provided better results, 
this was not possible due to time restrictions. Although existing grammars caused 
limitations in experimental results, it was still possible to obtain a proof of concept. The 
limitations will be discussed in Chapter 6. Therefore, future work should include rewriting 
language grammars. 
3.2.3. Lexers and Parsers 
The source code facts extraction framework uses ANTLR’s tool org.antlr.Tool to 
generate source files for the lexer and parser. The generated files are copied in the 
development environment to be compiled. The compiled files are called using the 
ANTLR’s library API to generate the intermediate tree representation (AST) for further 
processing.  
The lexer attaches meanings to the lexemes read from an input stream (i.e. source code). 
For example, in the PHP grammar from the APPENDIX, the lexemes: '==', '!=', 
'===', '!==' are classified as the EqualityOperator token by the PHP lexer. The 
lexer outputs a token stream, which is fed into the parser. Considering the line of code:  
a = 1; //assign  
the stream of tokens from a lexer to a parser will look as depicted in Figure 11. 
Lexer a = 1 ; //assign Parser
 
Figure 11 Stream of tokens from a lexer to a parser for the line of code a = 1; //assign 
The parser reads the token stream and matches patterns according to the specified rules. 
Consider the following lexer and parser rules: 
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/*--------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * PARSER RULES 
 *--------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
  
add:  NUMBER PLUS NUMBER;  
  
/*---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 * LEXER RULES 
 *--------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
  
NUMBER: ('0'..'9')+ ; 
  
PLUS: '+';  
 
For the 1 + 2 token stream the parser will match it as an add operation between two 
lexemes of type NUMBER. The action performed by the source code facts extraction 
framework is to generate an AST based on the matched pattern. This action results in the 
AST depicted in Figure 12. 
PLUS: ‘+’
NUMBER: ‘2’NUMBER: ‘1’
 
Figure 12 Generated AST for the 1 + 2 token stream 
The generated AST is a Java object of type CommonTree
21
 from the Java ANTLR API 
and it is used to manually traverse the AST by getting the children, token types etc. The 
algorithm for tree traversal is given in Section 3.3.1. The objective of the methodology is 
to obtain an independent form where reasoning about security vulnerabilities is possible. 
Section 3.2 focused on how to provide a fine-grained representation of source code. The 
framework achieves this using ASTs and the ANTLR’s library APIs. Section 3.3 describes 
the process of transforming source code represented by ASTs into a format (i.e. RDF) 
where static code analysis independent of the input format can be implemented. 
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 http://www.antlr3.org/api/Java/org/antlr/runtime/tree/CommonTree.html 
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3.3. Semantic Data  
An AST is an intermediate representation. Further processing is usually necessary (Aho, 
Lam, Sethi, & Ullman, 2006), whether it is for compiling purposes or in the case of this 
research, static code analysis. It was mentioned and demonstrated in Section 3.2 that an 
AST provides a fine-grained representation of source code facts, necessary for static code 
analysis, whilst also removing irrelevant information from parse trees. Next, the AST 
representation needs to be converted into a format where it is possible to detect patterns of 
code susceptible to malicious attacks independently of the format of the input data.  
Existing solutions as discussed in Section 2.2 have a common limitation, in that their 
solution is dependent on the input format. In this thesis, we turn to static code analysis 
using RDF. Data from potentially vulnerable programs is represented as triples in the 
Resource Description Framework (RDF) format with the purpose of being uniformly 
queried by machines in order to solve the problem of independent static code analysis. 
Programming code is exported to RDF, where reasoning using rules and inference engines 
can be uniformly implemented independently of the input language. 
The methodology uses Extensible Markup Language (XML) (W3C, 2013) as an 
intermediate representation between an AST and RDF. The algorithms that convert an 
AST to XML and XML data to the RDF format are given in Section 3.3.2 and Section 
3.3.4, respectively. This section also explains the reasoning behind choosing XML as an 
intermediate representation. First, information from an AST can be represented losslessly 
in XML using the same tree structure. Second, existing query languages can be employed 
to transform XML to RDF, whereas tools for direct conversion of an AST to RDF are not 
available. Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.3 explain the motivation for choosing XML as an 
intermediate format between an AST and source code represented in RDF. 
3.3.1. Representation of an AST Using XML 
Similar to an AST, XML documents are represented using a tree-like structure. The tree 
starts with a root node and branches to the leaves. Figure 13 shows an AST represented 
using XML. Both representations have the node ASSIGN: ‘assign’ as the root node 
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and VARIABLE: ‘a’, VARIABLE: ‘n’ and NUMBER: ‘1’ as leaves, with node 
branches in between. 
The source code facts extraction framework manually traverses the AST (obtained using 
the ANTLR APIs) recursively. For every node in the AST, a corresponding XML node is 
created. The XML node name corresponds to the token name of the AST node. The XML 
node content corresponds to the AST node string content. Details of the algorithm used 
follow in the next section. 
ASSIGN: ‘assign’
OPERATOR: ‘*’VARIABLE: ‘a’
OPERATOR: ‘-’VARIABLE: ‘a’
NUMBER: ‘1’VARIABLE: ‘n’
<ASSIGN>
assign
          <VARIABLE>
          a
          </VARIABLE>
          <OPERATOR>
          *
                  <VARIABLE>
                  a
                 </VARIABLE>
                 <OPERATOR>
                 -
                            <VARIABLE>
                             n
                             </VARIABLE>
                             <NUMBER>
                             1
                             </NUMBER>
                  </OPERATOR>
           </OPERATOR>
</ASSIGN>
AST representation XML representation
 
Figure 13 Representation of an AST using XML 
3.3.2. Tree Traversal Algorithm  
We used the following algorithm to output an AST into an XML document. Using a top-
down approach, each node of the AST is traversed and its children type and value are 
printed as <type>value</type>. For each child the process is repeated recursively, 
until the algorithm visits all nodes. The XML indentation is achieved using print “ “; 
times the given node’s depth level. Please note that the indentation is only for the purpose 
of improving readability; functionality wise it is of no importance. 
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void function outputXMLTree(tree, indent) { 
   if tree not empty { 
      for (i=0; i<=indent; i++) 
         print “ “; 
      for (i=0; i<number of tree children; i++){ 
         print “<” + child i type + “>”; 
         print child value; 
         outputXMLTree(child, indent+1); 
         print “<” + child i type + “>”;
      }
   }
}  
Listing 9 Tree traversal algorithm 
The previous section and this section showed that due to the structural similarity of an AST 
and an XML document, XML was chosen to first represent the information contained in an 
AST, because existing query languages can then be employed to convert XML to RDF. 
The next section describes this process.  
3.3.3. XML Query to Obtain RDF 
The Extensible Stylesheet Language Transformation (XSLT) provides one of the standard 
methods of querying XML documents (W3C, 1999). However, extracting RDF data from 
existing XML documents using XSLT has been acknowledged to be a non-trivial task 
(Akhtar, Kopecky, Krennwallner, & Polleres, 2008), by the Gleaning Resource 
Descriptions from Dialects of Languages (GRDDL) working group (W3C, 2007). Due to 
the flexibility of an RDF representation and its several serialization formats, using XSLT 
to handle RDF data is greatly complicated (Akhtar, Kopecky, Krennwallner, & Polleres, 
2008). XSLT was optimized to handle a fixed hierarchy in the form of a tree-like structure 
found in XML documents. The structure is conceptually different in an RDF document that 
does not contain a simple, well-known hierarchy. 
XQuery
22
 was introduced in 2007 to assist in processing XML, when it also became a 
W3C recommendation. Studies show that XQuery’s usability is greater than XSLT 
(Graaumans, 2005), introducing fewer concepts and less verboseness. Therefore, while 
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 http://www.w3.org/TR/xquery/ 
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either XML query language could have been used, XQuery was chosen based on its 
usability. 
Some tools are available for converting XML to RDF. However, these tools are not easy to 
integrate, as most are available as Web services
23
 or they need to be accessed via the 
command line
24
. Moreover, the available tools use only XSLT and as mentioned above, 
due to usability concerns, XQuery was chosen to extract data from XML. 
In light of this, the source code facts extraction framework uses XQuery to extract data 
from XML and to render it using RDF. The algorithm used for querying the XML data is 
given in the next section. 
3.3.4. XQuery Algorithm  
This section describes the process of converting XML data resulted from traversing an 
AST as described in Section 3.3.1, into RDF data. The reason for using XQuery to extract 
information from XML was explained in the previous section. Next, XML to RDF 
mapping steps are developed based on previous research. Based on the resulting mapping 
conventions, an XQuery algorithm is implemented. 
Mapping XML to RDF 
In querying and extracting data from XML in order to create an RDF document containing 
the same information, a top-down approach was used, starting with the mapping of an 
XML document into an RDF document. The mapping process is based on previous 
research on a simplified syntax for RDF (Melnik, 1999 and W3C, 2007). This research is 
suitable for our needs, as the XML data resulted from traversing the source code’s AST 
follows a simple structure, containing only tags and text content and no attributes (e.g. 
<tag noattribute=”attributevalue”>text content</tag>).  
When converting XML to RDF, every tag encountered in the XML document is 
considered a property name (or predicate) in RDF. The structure of the XML and its 
corresponding RDF representation as proposed in (Melnik, 1999) is shown in Figure 14. 
The nodes _:A1, _:A2 and _:A3 are anonymous nodes. Section 2.3.2 introduces the 
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 http://rhizomik.net/html/redefer/#XML2RDF 
24
 http://sourceforge.net/projects/xmltordf/ 
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concept of an anonymous node, or a blank node. A blank node is an RDF resource for 
which an URI or a literal does not exist. The Notation 3 convention is used for representing 
blank nodes, i.e. Notation 3 uses a special _: namespace prefix to define blank nodes. 
<?xml  version=”1.0"?>
<root>
          <child>
                    <subchild>
                            Text content
                   </subchild>
           </child>
</root>
XML structure
_:A1
root
_:A2
child
_:A3
subchild
Text content
RDF graph
 
Figure 14 XML data structure and proposed conversion to RDF (Melnik, 1999) 
As opposed to the XML structure analysed in previous research, when traversing a source 
code’s AST to obtain XML, the resulting nodes can contain both text content and sub 
children.  For example, in Figure 15, the <OPERATOR> node contains both the “-“ text 
content and two children, <VARIABLE> and <NUMBER>. As previously proposed, the tag 
can be represented by an RDF property. However, text content cannot be considered a 
predicate, as it has no sub children and thus, no RDF objects to create an RDF statement. 
Therefore, the text content must be considered an RDF object and thus, an RDF predicate 
is needed to create an RDF triple. The RDF concepts vocabulary defines the value 
predicate as “Idiomatic property used for structured values.” (W3C, 2004). Based on the 
discussion from Section 2.3.1, the predicate can be reused to create RDF statements.  
In light of this, Figure 15 shows the corresponding representation of an XML document 
resulted from the AST traversal, into an RDF graph. The “:” prefix corresponds to the 
http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/ namespace, discussed in Section 2.3.1. 
The Notation 3 representation from Figure 15 aims to provide clarification in terms of full 
predicate names, including namespaces.  
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<?xml  version=”1.0"?>
<OPERATOR>
 -
          <VARIABLE>
           n
           </VARIABLE>
           <NUMBER>
            1
           </NUMBER>
</OPERATOR>
XML document from 
AST traversal
_:A0
:OPERATOR
_:A1
rdf
:va
lue -
:VARIABLE
_:A2
rdf:value
n
_:A3
:N
U
M
B
ER
rdf:value
1
RDF graph
_:A0                                                                      <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/OPERATOR>             _:A1
_:A1                                                           <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "-"
_:A1                                                           <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/VARIABLE>             :_A2
_:A2                                                           <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "n"
_:A1                                                           <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/NUMBER>                  _:A3
_:A3                                                                       <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "1"
RDF triples (N3)
 
Figure 15 Representation of XML data using RDF graph 
Algorithm 
The previous section details the mapping process between the source code facts XML 
representation and the corresponding RDF representation. In order to translate source code 
from an XML format to an RDF format, anonymous nodes and the rdf:value predicate 
were used.   
XQuery is used in this research to query an XML document and to build a new RDF 
document. The reason for choosing the XQuery language was given in the introduction of 
Section 3.3.4. In order to build new documents, XQuery provides constructors that can 
create XML structures (W3C, 2010). Because XQuery provides constructors for an XML 
structure, the output RDF format after conversion will be RDF/XML and thus, XQuery 
cannot be used to create N3 (Notation 3) documents. Introduced first in Section 2.3.2, 
RDF/XML is a syntax used to express an RDF graph as an XML document. Therefore, 
before designing the XQuery algorithm, an RDF/XML representation of the RDF graph is 
needed. Figure 16 shows the RDF/XML representation of the RDF document given in 
Notation 3 format. The RDF document in Notation 3 is the result of mapping XML to 
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RDF, explained in the previous section. To convert from Notation 3 to RDF/XML, the 
RDF Validator and Converter
25
 tool was used. 
RDF document (RDF/XML)
<rdf:RDF 
   xmlns:rdf=”http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#”>
<rdf:Description> 
   <OPERATOR xmlns="http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/"
             rdf:parseType="Resource">
       <rdf:value>-</rdf:value>
       <VARIABLE rdf:parseType="Resource">
           <rdf:value>n</rdf:value>
       </VARIABLE>
       <NUMBER rdf:parseType="Resource">
           <rdf:value>1</rdf:value>
       </NUMBER>
    </OPERATOR>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
_:A0                                                                      <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/OPERATOR>             _:A1
_:A1                                                           <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "-"
_:A1                                                           <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/VARIABLE>             :_A2
_:A2                                                           <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "n"
_:A1                                                           <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/NUMBER>                  _:A3
_:A3                                                                       <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#value>            "1"
RDF document (N3)
 
Figure 16 Notation 3 RDF document and corresponding RDF/XML representation 
The algorithm that is required to produce the RDF/XML representation is outlined as 
follows. A recursive method visits all nodes in the XML document, and depending on 
whether the XML node currently processed has text content or it is an XML element two 
actions are taken. If the XML node has text content, then the XQuery algorithm creates an 
rdf:value RDF/XML node. Otherwise, the XQuery algorithm creates an 
rdf:parseType= “Resource” RDF/XML node and the recursive method is called 
on the children of the currently processed element. The recursive method stops when there 
are no more XML nodes to process.  
The XQuery function that implements the algorithm is given in Listing 10. An XML node 
has an element and an optional attribute. The query traverses every element from the XML 
DOM tree, and uses the XQuery element and attributes constructors to create an 
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 http://www.rdfabout.com/demo/validator/ 
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RDF statement. The element part is created with the element XQuery constructor and 
the attribute part is created with the attribute XQuery constructor. QName is used to 
create the name of the element, i.e. for the <OPERATOR> element, OPERATOR is the 
name. The QName function also provides the possibility to add a namespace to the local 
name of the XML element processed. In the function from Listing 10, 
‘http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/’ is a namespace that it added to every 
newly created RDF/XML element. Therefore, if the XML element to convert is 
<OPERATOR> then its corresponding RDF/XML element is <OPERATOR 
xmlns=”http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/”>. 
declare function local:extract($element as element()) as element() {
   element {QName('http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/', 
            local-name($element))}
      { attribute { 'rdf:parseType' } { 'Resource' }, 
for $child in $element/node()
            return
            if ($child instance of element())
         then local:extract($child)
      else
         if (normalize-space($child) = '')
       then()
                   else element { 'rdf:value'} 
                                { normalize-space($child) }
      }
}
 
Listing 10 XQuery function to convert XML representation of source code to RDF format 
The algorithm performs two steps: 
1. Creates an XQuery element in the form of: 
element {computedname} {content} 
where {computedname} is an XQuery QName and {content} is an XQuery 
attribute element. In an RDF statement, the QName will represent a predicate for 
the XML element nodes with a blank node as the subject. Specifically, to create a 
QName a namespace is added to the local name of the element. We used a domain 
name for the namespace to uniquely identify the source code entity: 
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QName('http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/’,  
local-name($element)) 
2. Creates an XQuery attribute element in the form of: 
attribute {computedname} {content} 
where {computedname} is rdf:parseType= ”Resource” and the value 
of {content} depends whether the XML node is an element node or a text node. 
(a) If the XML node is an element node then its children are traversed starting from 
step 1.; 
(b) If the XML node is a text node then the text will be represented as the RDF 
object part of an rdf:value predicate. In XQuery a new element is constructed 
for the {content} part of the attribute element: 
element {'rdf:value'} 
        {normalize-space($child)} 
The algorithm uses blank nodes to create the RDF document. As mentioned in Section 
2.3.2 a blank node is an RDF resource for which an URI or a literal does not exist. Blank 
nodes are created with the attribute rdf:parseType=”Resource” and a set of 
properties are attached to these anonymous resources. Notation 3 uses a special _: 
namespace prefix to define blank nodes. The blank node _:A1 has three properties: an 
rdf:value, a :VARIABLE and a :NUMBER property. As mentioned in Section 2.3.2 
RDF is commonly represented using Notation 3 and RDF/XML. Notation 3 is used for 
improving its readability. 
When converting source code to RDF, the properties of a node (e.g. VARIABLE and 
NUMBER) correspond to the lexemes defined by the lexer and the operations defined by the 
parser of the applied grammar. 
3.4. Summary 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology and the algorithms for extracting source code facts 
and representing them using a common format, specifically RDF. Extracting source code 
facts had two objectives. First, the representation needs to have the fine-granularity for 
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permitting a static code analysis, whilst also removing unnecessary information that would 
cause performance issues. This was achieved using ASTs and the ANTLR library. Second, 
the representation must be in a format independent of the source code programming 
language that will also allow for detection of security vulnerabilities. In order to leverage 
Semantic Web technologies and reason about security vulnerabilities, an AST was used as 
an independent, intermediate representation. Therefore, an AST was converted to RDF as 
the final representation, where reasoning techniques can be applied to find code susceptible 
to malicious attacks using Semantic Web technologies. The motives for using Semantic 
Web technologies are supported by existing frameworks that employ these technologies to 
implement security, as described in Section 2.3.5. 
The next chapter will describe the methodology, including algorithms and implementation 
for finding Web application vulnerabilities by reasoning with Semantic Web technologies 
on top of the source code in RDF format. This methodology is applied after extracting the 
source code facts as described throughout Chapter 3. 
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4. DETECTION OF WEB APPLICATION VULNERABILITIES USING 
SEMANTIC WEB REASONING 
This chapter focuses on the methods used to detect security vulnerabilities in source code 
represented in RDF, after being translated from original input. The framework and 
algorithms employed to extract source code facts from programs are described in the 
previous chapter. 
The objectives of the methods presented in this chapter are to detect code susceptible to 
malicious attacks independently of the input language. The focus is on detecting input 
validation vulnerabilities and information leaks, as they account for the majority of 
problems related to Web application attacks, as illustrated in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
As shown in Section 1.1.1, the last six years have seen a major increase in security 
vulnerabilities caused by insufficient input validation, with the highest number of 
vulnerabilities corresponding to the year 2013. Furthermore, the vulnerabilities caused by 
improper implementation of information-flow control methods account for more than 50% 
of all Web application vulnerabilities found in the year 2013. 
This research focuses on SQL injection, cross-site scripting, HTTP splitting, e-mail 
injection and information leak attacks, but it is not limited to only these attacks. This 
chapter will describe the methodology for detecting Web application vulnerabilities in 
code, which can be applied to a broader list of attacks than the ones mentioned for the 
proof of concept. 
4.1. Detecting Web Application Security Vulnerabilities Using Code 
Patterns  
Section 2.2 mentions that a viable method for securing programming code is the analysis 
of its information flow. In determining for example, whether a potentially dangerous 
function call can cause a security problem if exploited by an attacker, in general, it can be 
answered by analysing its arguments and determining if their value originates from a 
trusted source. These arguments, however, need to be traced in the source code to find out 
where their value originates. If their value originates from an untrusted source, and the 
value was not properly sanitized, it can be concluded that the potentially dangerous 
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function call is a vulnerable piece of code. Tracing the origin of the argument of the 
function call represents the process of analysing the information flow in a program.  
A recently found bug in the OpenSSL
26
 implementation of the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocol, called the Heartbleed bug
27
, allows an attacker to read up to 64KB of 
memory in a single request, which if done a sufficient number of times, will expose the 
Web application server’s main private keys. The vulnerability is caused by not properly 
checking the value of an argument given as input to a potentially dangerous operation. A 
static code analysis method of the program’s information flow control could have detected 
the vulnerability. In this case, the potentially dangerous operation used was 
OPENSSL_malloc that allocates memory for the server’s response. See code snippet 
below. 
/* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 byte 
 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus 
 * payload, plus padding 
 */ 
buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); 
 
The value of one of the arguments, payload, is not checked and thus, it can contain any 
value, causing the function call to allocate the maximum size of the server’s private 
memory and ultimately, to return its contents to the user. Tracing the payload variable 
for its value’s origin shows that the payload value is created by copying payload 
length bytes from the pointer pl. See lines 1 and 2 of the code snippet below. Thus, the 
value of payload is tainted which makes the code vulnerable to a Web application 
attack.   
1. n2s(p, payload); 
2. unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; 
Using information flow control static code analysis, the OPENSSL_malloc function call 
could have been marked as a potentially dangerous operation and thus, its arguments 
would have been required to be checked against the possibility of being tainted. Tracing 
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 https://www.openssl.org/ 
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the origin of the payload argument shows that its value is tainted and therefore, that the 
program contains a vulnerable piece of code.  
In determining what operations are considered as potentially dangerous, a viable approach 
is to determine the entry points into a Web application and train the code review method 
with patterns of code vulnerable to Web application attacks (Shah, 2006). For example, 
vulnerable entry points into a Web application are the HTTP variables. Developers use the 
HTTP Request variable to read information from a user of the Web application through an 
HTTP form. Therefore, in a ASP.NET application, the code review needs to be trained that 
the pattern of code ".*.[Rr]equest.*[^\n]\n" expressed as a regular expression, 
constitutes an entry point to a Web application that if not guarded can open up potential 
vulnerabilities in the application. Once the patterns are expressed and the code scanned for 
these patterns, their arguments need to be traced to determine if their value is tainted. We 
have shown using the Heartbleed bug example, how this approach can help to determine if 
a program contains snippets of vulnerable code. 
This thesis’ proposed method will use inference rules to express patterns of code 
vulnerable to malicious attacks and will apply reasoning to determine vulnerable entry 
points and to trace arguments for their value’s origin, independently of the application’s 
underlying programming language. The rest of this chapter will describe the creation of the 
inference rules and the reasoning algorithm. 
4.1.1. Entry Point Identification 
In securing a Web application’s underlying code, entry points into the Web application 
must be identified, as they can also serve as entry points for attacks (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2003). It was shown throughout Section 1.2 that an attacker can potentially 
use specially crafted data to cause the application to behave in an unexpected way and gain 
access to sensitive information. These issues can in general be prevented by sanitizing user 
input. However, when the proper sanitization is not in place, a testing tool should detect 
the code that is vulnerable to attack. Furthermore, the previous section reiterates that a 
phase to identify entry points is needed early in the process of testing an application for 
vulnerabilities. After the identification of entry points, the variables that contain the tainted 
data coming from entry points need to be traced throughout the application in order to 
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determine if the tainted data is used in a potentially dangerous operation. Once the entry 
points are identified, using this thesis’ proposed methodology, Jena rules will be created 
from patterns of code that allow untrusted data to enter the application through these entry 
points. Reasoning with rules over a Web application’s RDF translation will infer whether 
the application is using any information coming from an untrusted source. 
This section identifies commonly used entry points into a Web application. According to 
Microsoft Corporation (2003) a Web application can have the following entry points: 
1. Logical application entry points that are available to the client through the Web 
application user interface, such as:  
 Query strings are part of a uniform resource locator (URL), in the following 
form: http://server/program/path/?query_string, containing 
data that needs to be passed to a Web application. An attacker can easily 
manipulate the query string values, as they are displayed in the browser’s 
address bar, due to the use of the HTTP GET protocol. 
 Form field values are sent to the server using the HTTP POST protocol. Form 
fields can be visible or hidden and the values of both types of fields can be used 
to for example, inject code, such as in the case of SQL injection attacks. 
 Cookie values can be changed by a client of a Web application using tools, such 
as Edit Cookies Firefox add-on
28
 and used to gain unauthorized access to a 
website. 
2. Physical or platform entry points include ports and sockets. Programming 
constructs can be used to access and read information from these resources and 
information read from these entry points is considered untrusted. One Java example 
is reading data using an outbound TCP connection using the Socket
29
 class: sock 
= new Socket("host.example.org", 39544);  
Once the entry points are identified, the next step is to find patterns of code that allow 
entry point data to enter an application. Together with test cases
30
 that are made available 
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 https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/edit-cookies/ 
29
 http://docs.oracle.com/javase/7/docs/api/java/net/Socket.html 
30
 http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/testsuite.php 
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by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), we identified these patterns 
by manually analyzing the source code in the test cases. The test cases contain examples of 
various injection issues, including input triggering the vulnerability. Some examples of 
these patterns of code are given in Listing 11. 
/* Read data using an outbound tcp connection */  
Socket sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); 
          
/* Read data from an HTML form */  
String user = request.getParameter("user"); 
 
/* Read data from console */  
InputStreamReader instrread = null; 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(System.in); 
 
/* Get environment variable ADD */ 
data = System.getenv("ADD"); 
Listing 11 Examples of Java patterns of code for input triggering security vulnerabilities in a Web 
application 
Jena rules are created from these patterns of code. An inference engine will use these rules 
to reason on top of the code in RDF and to check if data from untrusted sources enters the 
application under inspection. If the application reads data from an untrusted source, then 
the data will be traced throughout the application’s code to determine if tainted data is used 
in a potentially dangerous operation. This approach was illustrated using the Heartbleed 
bug example in the beginning of Section 4.1. The next section describes the methodology 
for tracing information flow in a program. 
4.1.2. Tracing Information Flow 
In the context of static code analysis, information-flow control methods trace the flow of 
data throughout the application’s code to ensure no leakage of sensitive data. Several types 
of information-flow control methods were described in Section 2.2. 
In this thesis, the tracing of information flow takes place after patterns of code have 
indicated that unsafe data coming from untrusted sources has entered the application. The 
previous section describes how to determine if the code under inspection uses data from 
outside the application. 
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Using variable assignments in the code, unsanitized and unsafe data could travel inside the 
application and ultimately be used in a potentially dangerous operation causing a security 
breach. A simple example is a vulnerable segment of C# code shown in Listing 12. 
Through the Request object in line 1, unsafe data enters the application. Using the 
variable assignments in lines 2, 3 and 4, this data travels inside the application, propagating 
itself as the code runs. Because the tainted data contained in the pro_id variable is used 
in dangerous operations, lines 5 and 6 represent vulnerable code. Line 5 can cause a SQL 
injection attack and line 6 can cause an XSS attack. These attacks were explained in 
Section 1.2.1. 
1. NameValueCollection nvc = Request.QueryString; 
2. String[] arr1 = nvc.AllKeys; 
3. String[] sta2 = nvc.GetValues(arr1[0]); 
4. pro_id = sta2[0]; 
5. String qry = "select * from items where product_id=" + 
pro_id; 
6. response.write(pro_id); 
Listing 12 Vulnerable code caused by assignment of unsafe data read from an untrusted source 
In tracing information flow, patterns of code that represent assignments need to be 
identified and Jena rules need to be created to express these patterns of code. Using the 
same method as the previous section, reasoning using the resulting Jena rules will infer 
whether data is propagated in the code and this reasoning will be applied until the end of 
the trace is reached. The end of the trace is reached when there are no more assignments. 
In Listing 12, the end of the trace is reached when the inference engine finds the 
assignment of tainted data to the pro_id variable. Because no new variables use the 
value of pro_id, the tracing of information flow phase ends. 
Examples of patterns of code that propagate data inside the application can be classified 
under two categories: direct assignments and indirect assignments using programming 
language library objects. An example of a direct assignment is pro_id = sta2[0], 
while an indirect assignment could be: instrread = new 
InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()). Although the second type of 
assignment is dependent on the programming language used, Section 4.2.2 shows that 
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wildcards can be used inside the Jena rules in order to reason on top of the programming 
code, independently of the language used. 
This phase is the most tedious one as there are numerous patterns of code that cause 
possible propagation of tainted data. As mentioned in Section 4.1.1, we chose the test 
cases
31
 that are made available by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) to identify these patterns. This website includes a collection of test cases in several 
programming languages: Java, PHP, C/C++, JSP as well as several Web applications 
containing CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), such as chrome-5.0.375.54 
and wireshark-1.2.0. It contains examples of CVEs, for example, various injection issues 
and tainted data mishandling, including input triggering the vulnerability. The current 
release contains 32 test suites, while 11 test suites reside in the archive. The number of test 
cases contained in every archive varies from three in the jspwiki-2.5.124 Web application 
to 61,387 in the Juliet Test Suite for C/C++. 
4.1.3. Vulnerability Detection 
The previous section describes how to trace tainted data inside a Web application. When 
the end of the trace is reached, the last variable that contains tainted data is checked, in this 
phase, to determine if it is used in a potentially dangerous operation. This phase is the 
vulnerability detection phase. In the example from Listing 12, the end of the information 
flow trace is reached with the pro_id variable, as there are no more assignments that use 
this variable. 
The vulnerability detection phase will match patterns of code that may cause a security 
breach and that use as arguments variables found in the previous section to contain tainted 
data. This phase finds that the pro_id variable from Listing 12 is used in two operations 
that may cause different Web application attacks, SQL injection and cross-site scripting. 
The patterns of code are the building of a SQL query using tainted data:  
String qry="select * from items where product_id=" + pro_id,  
and throwing non-validated input back to the browser using 
response.write(pro_id). Section 1.2.1 explains why these operations may cause 
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security breaches. In the former case, because the pro_id is passed non-validated to the 
SQL SELECT statement, an attacker can manipulate its value and inject SQL payload. 
Similarly, an attacker, in the latter case, can inject client-side script into the user’s webpage 
and steal session cookies for user authentication, for example. 
The patterns that can cause security breaches if used in conjunction with non-validated 
data are identified from the NIST website mentioned in the previous sections. Some 
examples of patterns of code and the potential flaws taken from the website are given in 
Listing 13. 
/* POTENTIAL FLAW: absolute path traversal */ 
IO.writeLine(new BufferedReader (new             
                 FileReader(fIn)).readLine()); 
 
/* POTENTIAL FLAW: command injection */ 
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(osCommand + data); 
 
/* POTENTIAL FLAW: HTTP response splitting, input not 
verified before inclusion in the cookie */ 
response.addCookie(cookieSink); 
 
/* POTENTIAL FLAW: use of hard-coded password */ 
conn2 = DriverManager.getConnection("data-url","root", pw); 
Listing 13 Examples of potential flaws from the NIST website 
This section describes when it is necessary to identify patterns of code susceptible to Web 
attacks. Identifying vulnerable patterns alone is not sufficient. These patterns of code need 
to contain as input non-validated data in order to cause a security breach. Input from 
previous phases, described in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, will be used to determine if 
potentially dangerous operations represent a security breach. 
The next section describes how to create rules from the patterns identified throughout 
Section 4.1 and the methodology used to reason on top of the code in RDF. 
4.2. Methodology Overview     
Section 4.1 describes how to detect Web application vulnerabilities using code patterns. 
This section illustrates how to implement this approach using Semantic Web technologies. 
In Section 4.1, this approach is divided into three main phases: entry point identification, 
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tracing information flow and vulnerability detection. It was explained that Jena rules are 
created from patterns of code identified in these three phases. Figure 17a illustrates the 
process of creating rules from patterns of code. The end of the rule creation phase will 
result in three Jena rule sets corresponding to the patterns identified in the entry points 
identification, tracing variable and vulnerability detection phases. Section 4.2.2 describes 
how Jena rule sets are created. 
1. Rule 
Creation
Code patterns
Jena rule 
set
Entry points
Tracing variables
Vulnerabilities
Jena rule 
set (N3)
Configuration 
(forward RETE)
Reasoner
Source code 
(Java, PHP, etc.)
Model (source
code in RDF)
Source Code 
Extraction 
Framework
2. Inference
3. Interpreting 
Results
Get Deduction Model
Add Results to Model
a. Rule creation stage
b. Vulnerability detection 
stage  
Figure 17 Web application vulnerabilities detection methodology using code patterns and Semantic Web 
technologies 
The three main phases described in Section 4.1 follow the same path, which is illustrated 
using a graph in Figure 17b. A Semantic Web reasoner is created using the Jena rule set 
corresponding to the entry point patterns and a chosen configuration for the inference 
engine. The proposed methodology uses a forward chaining engine with the RETE 
algorithm (Forgy, 1982). Because the Jena framework offers two types of inference 
engines, Section 4.2.1 explains why this configuration was chosen.  
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The RDF data extracted from the source code of the Web application under test is available 
in the form of a Jena RDF Model (a set of RDF statements), after the initial source code 
facts extraction phase. The source code facts extraction framework is described in Chapter 
3. An inference model is created by associating the reasoner with the source code model. If 
additional RDF assertions are derived, then they are added to the initial source code model 
and used as input for the next phase. The same steps are followed in the next phase.  
For example, if the entry points identification phase finds that the application uses data 
from untrusted sources, then the deduction model will contain new RDF statements 
indicating the variables that contain data from outside the application. These statements 
will be added to the source code’s RDF model and the new deduction model from the 
information flow trace phase will infer new statements if there are assignments from the 
entry points variables to new variables. The dotted line in Figure 17b indicates the flow of 
information from the output of one phase into the input of the next phase.  
The vulnerability detection phase is the last phase with its output only being interpreted, 
and not used as input for another phase. At the end of this phase, the interpretation of the 
results will conclude if the source code is vulnerable to attacks or not. In the former case, 
the output of the last phase is the types of attack that can be performed successfully on the 
input program. The deduction model at the end of every phase and its interpretation is 
described in Section 4.2.4. 
Therefore, three major stages are identified in the methodology of vulnerability detection 
using Semantic Web technologies. These are illustrated using numbers in Figure 17: 
1. Rule creation  
2. Inference 
3. Interpreting the deduction model  
These three major stages are described in more detail in the rest of this chapter. In Section 
4.2.1, the motives for using the forward chaining engine with the RETE algorithm are 
given.  
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Section 4.2.2 describes how patterns of code are represented using Jena rules. For every 
type of pattern (e.g. entry point identification, tracing information flow and vulnerability 
detection) a set of Jena rules are created using the source code facts extraction framework. 
This represents the rule creation phase. In this case, the Source code item from Figure 8 in 
Section 3.1 is a code pattern: an entry point, an assignment or a vulnerability pattern. 
Therefore, the source code facts extraction framework is used to create the patterns of code 
in RDF (represented by Jena rules). Section 4.2.2 describes this process in detail. 
After the patterns of code are represented in RDF, an inference engine is employed to find 
these patterns in the source code. The source code facts extraction framework described in 
Section 3.1 is also used to represent the source code of the Web application under test in 
RDF.  The inference mechanism is described in detail in Section 4.2.3. Figure 17b 
illustrates that the patterns represented in RDF (e.g. the Jena rule set) are an input to the 
reasoner used by the inference mechanism. The output from applying the inference 
mechanism is a set of statements (e.g. RDF triples) that are further interpreted in a last 
phase to determine if the RDF patterns were found in the source code. Section 4.2.4 
describes how the result from the inference process (e.g. the deduction model) is 
interpreted. 
The proposed methodology does not use ontologies for the inference process. Although the 
use of ontologies has been considered for the implementation of the methodology, there 
are published works describing the limitations of ontologies and the need to add rules to 
overcome these limitations (Eiter, Ianni, Polleres, Schindlauer, & Tompits, 2006; Bavarian 
& Wohner, 2001). Moreover, the limitations of the proposed methodology described in 
Chapter 6 could not be overcome by using an ontology in addition to rules. 
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4.2.1. Forward and Backward Chaining 
For reasoning purposes, the Jena framework includes a general rule-based reasoner that 
can be used to implement an RDFS
32
 or an OWL
33
 reasoner, but which can be also used 
for general purposes (Apache Software Foundation, 2014). The Jena framework was first 
introduced in Section 2.3.3 and the reasons for choosing this framework for processing 
data were given.  
RDFS and OWL are Semantic Web formats, commonly used to process information. 
However, they have limitations and cause performance issues (Gua, Punga, & Zhang, 
2005). Reasoning using user-defined rules has been proven to be more flexible than 
reasoning using OWL and RDFS (Clark & Parsia, 2014). Therefore, this methodology 
employs the Jena rule-based reasoner for its general use.  
The general use reasoner supports rule-based inference over RDF graphs and provides 
functionality through two internal engines;  a forward chaining engine and a backward 
chaining engine. The forward chaining engine is based on the standard RETE algorithm 
(Forgy, 1982). The RETE algorithm will be discussed in Section 6.1, as it has a limitation 
that affects the performance of the proposed methodology for detecting Web application 
vulnerabilities. These engine configurations are accessible through the 
GenericRuleReasoner
34
 class. To create a GenericRuleReasoner object the 
minimum required is a list of Jena rules, also called a rule set. Section 4.2.2 describes the 
creation of rules that will be given as a parameter to the generic rule reasoner constructor. 
This section aims to compare the two different engine configurations and to outline the 
motives for this methodology’s choice for forward chaining. 
For the detection of Web application vulnerabilities using reasoning, data consists of 
source code extracted from a Web application. Given this data, the goal is to find Web 
application vulnerabilities by searching for patterns of code susceptible to Web application 
attacks. Often, to conclude that a line of code causes a security breach, the line of code 
itself is not enough to make a final decision and more information is needed. Section 1.2.1 
                                                          
32
 http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-schema/ 
33
 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/ 
34
 http://jena.apache.org/documentation/javadoc/jena/com/hp/hpl/jena/reasoner/rulesys/GenericRuleRe 
asoner.html 
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contains an example of a command injection vulnerable code. The code below illustrates 
this example.  
int main(char* argc, char** argv) { 
 char cmd[CMD_MAX] = "/usr/bin/cat "; 
 strcat(cmd, argv[1]); 
 system(cmd); 
}  
The line of code system(cmd); displays a file’s content to the user. Analysing the line 
of code alone will not result in a definite conclusion, whether it is susceptible to an attack 
or not. However, by analysing the lines of code above it, it can be concluded that command 
line input that was not sanitized is used for building the filename for which the contents 
will be displayed to the user. As mentioned in Section 1.2.1, if an attacker uses the input 
“;rm –rf /” instead, the system call will not execute the cat command due the 
insufficient number of arguments and if run with root privileges it will continue by 
recursively deleting all the contents of nearly every writable mounted filesystem on the 
computer. Eventually, the computer will crash due to missing a crucial file or directory. In 
this instance, more data needs to be extracted before inferring that the line of code 
system(cmd); is susceptible to a command injection attack.  
In (Feigenbaum, McCorduck, & Nii, 1988) forward chaining was described as a reasoning 
method employed by inference engines that starting with known facts uses inference rules 
to extract more facts until a goal is reached. The example above shows that in order to 
reach the goal that the inspected code is susceptible to a command injection attack, new 
facts were asserted, i.e. command line arguments were not properly sanitized and used in a 
potentially dangerous operation. As opposed to forward chaining, the backward chaining 
method (Feigenbaum, McCorduck, & Nii, 1988) does not start with known facts. 
Backward chaining starts with a goal and tries to find facts that satisfy that goal. Therefore, 
forward chaining was used as the preferred method for reasoning. 
The Jena framework provides two forward chaining engines for its inference support, an 
earlier non-RETE engine and a RETE engine. The non-RETE implementation can be more 
efficient in some circumstances (Apache Software Foundation, 2014), but according to the 
Jena framework documentation, this alternative engine is likely to be removed in a future 
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release. Specifically, there is an issue where the non-RETE engine multi-triggers when it 
should only trigger once and the issue will not be fixed, as explained in the Jena mailing 
list
35
. The non-RETE engine functionality is only available because of backward 
compatibility. Therefore, the RETE engine was chosen for the implementation of the 
inference mechanism.  
4.2.2. Rule Creation 
In the rule creation stage, the rules are created automatically from source code patterns 
given as input, corresponding to the three phases mentioned in Section 4.1: entry points 
identification, tracing information flow and vulnerability detection. Examples of these code 
patterns were given in Section 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3, respectively.  
During the rule creation stage, we encountered a limitation when working with language 
grammars. More details of this limitation will be given in Section 6.2. In order to be able to 
parse Java code, for example, to create an AST, the code must have a proper Java syntax 
(e.g. package name, class name, method declaration etc.). Therefore, although a rule is 
created for a single line of code, several other lines of code needed to be added first, in 
order to have a proper Java file that can be parsed and converted to RDF. This results in 
extra RDF statements, which need to be removed after the rule creation process. During 
this stage, most statements that are irrelevant for reasoning (e.g. the extra RDF statements) 
are removed. More detail about this will be given in Section 6.2.  
The result of the rule creation stage is three Jena rule sets corresponding to the three phases 
described in Section 4.1 and used by the Jena reasoner to match patterns in a Web 
application’s source code. The same process is followed for all three rule sets. A rule set is 
simply a list of rules. This stage is the most tedious as several different patterns may exist 
for the same type of attack or entry points. Furthermore, there are numerous patterns of 
code for entry points, propagation of data and dangerous operations. Examples for these 
patterns were given in Section 4.1. We chose the test cases
36
 that are made available by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to identify these patterns. This 
website includes a collection of test cases in several programming languages. It contains 
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examples of various injection issues and tainted data mishandling, including input 
triggering the vulnerability. 
It was explained that the rules written throughout the proposed methodology use the 
forward chaining method. Forward chaining starts with available data and infers new data 
when the antecedent (If clause) is met. Using the forward chaining method, an inference 
engine will look for statements that match the antecedent and when found, the consequent 
(Then clause) is inferred. The reason for using forward chaining as opposed to backward 
chaining was given in Section 4.2.1. 
The definition of a Jena rule was discussed in Section 2.3.3. The format used for rules 
throughout the detection of vulnerabilities is given in Listing 14.  
Rule := [ ruleName : bare-rule ] 
 
bare-rule :=   term, ... term -> hterm    // forward rule 
 
hterm     :=   term 
          
term      :=   (node, node, node)       // triple pattern 
           
node      :=   uri-ref            // e.g. http://foo.com/eg 
          or   prefix:localname   // e.g. rdf:type 
          or   <uri-ref>          // e.g. <myscheme:myuri> 
          or   ?varname           // variable 
          or   'a literal'        // a plain string literal 
          or   'lex'^^typeURI     // a typed literal 
          or   number             // e.g. 42 or 25.5 
Listing 14 Code pattern rule format 
Variables and Wildcards 
When creating Jena rules from code patterns two terms are defined: Variables and 
Wildcards. Variables are any programming code identifiers and they are used to trace 
information throughout the process of finding Web application vulnerabilities. Wildcards 
are any programming code variables, object names or method names that can contain any 
value. Wildcards in the generated Jena rules can be substituted with any values. Their 
numbers are assigned randomly as there is no need for tracing their value. 
For example, consider the Java code in Listing 15 that reads input from a socket. The entry 
point in this case is through the sock variable and the entry point pattern is sock = new 
79 
 
Socket("host.example.org", 39544); According to the proposed 
methodology, a Jena rule needs to be generated. The sock variable is considered to 
contain tainted data, as it contains information from outside the application, and therefore 
tracing the information flow is imperative. The tainted data is propagated through the 
instrread variable, using the second assignment in the code. 
sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); 
 
/* read input from socket */ 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
Listing 15 Java code that reads input from socket 
To generate a Jena rule for the entry point pattern sock = new 
Socket("host.example.org", 39544);, sock is considered a Variable, whilst 
"host.example.org" and 39544 are considered Wildcards. The sock object is a 
Variable because it requires tracing. In this instance, it does propagate the data from the 
sock.getInputStream() object method via the second line of code. The two 
Wildcards can take any value.  
Remove 
headers 
triples
Add 
headers
Create rule: source 
code extraction 
framework + triple 
traversal
Code 
pattern
Rule
Variables,
Wildcards
 
Figure 18 Rule creation flow diagram 
Figure 18 shows the flow diagram involved in creating any rule for any type of pattern. 
This stage, as well as the Web application’s source code translation to RDF, requires the 
source code facts extraction framework. This framework is used to convert the code pattern 
to RDF after the headers for proper syntax have been added. An input to this step is the 
array of Variables and Wildcards, for which the content is decided manually, by looking at 
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the code pattern. The source code facts extraction framework converts the code pattern to 
an RDF/XML representation, which is then traversed to build the Jena rule, as it requires a 
specific syntax. This syntax is given at the beginning of this section, in Listing 14. 
For the sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); code pattern, 
the source code facts extraction framework has the output given in Listing 16. It was 
mentioned that RDF/XML is a verbose format, and thus we have previously refrained from 
listing examples using this format, although for the sake of this example, the output of the 
translation process was printed. Section 2.3.2 mentions that N3 was proposed as an 
alternative to the RDF/XML serialization, due to its readability and the ease of writing 
RDF statements. Note that the bold font is used to highlight the extra statements that were 
added automatically through the conversion of the class (e.g class 
SQLInjection_example1) and method (e.g. public method) Java definitions to 
RDF, in order to create a proper Java program. 
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"> 
   <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.oanaureche.com/unit"> 
      <unit xmlns="http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/"  
    rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
         <ANNOTATION_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
            <rdf:value>ANNOTATION_LIST</rdf:value> 
         </ANNOTATION_LIST> 
         <CLASS rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
            <rdf:value>class</rdf:value> 
            <MODIFIER_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>MODIFIER_LIST</rdf:value> 
            </MODIFIER_LIST> 
            <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>SQLInjection_example1</rdf:value> 
            </IDENT> 
            <CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE</rdf:value> 
               <VOID_METHOD_DECL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                  <rdf:value>VOID_METHOD_DECL</rdf:value> 
                  <MODIFIER_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>MODIFIER_LIST</rdf:value> 
                     <PUBLIC rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                        <rdf:value>public</rdf:value> 
                     </PUBLIC> 
                  </MODIFIER_LIST> 
                  <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>method</rdf:value> 
                  </IDENT> 
                  <FORMAL_PARAM_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>FORMAL_PARAM_LIST</rdf:value> 
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                  </FORMAL_PARAM_LIST> 
                  <BLOCK_SCOPE rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>BLOCK_SCOPE</rdf:value> 
                     <EXPR rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                        <rdf:value>EXPR</rdf:value> 
                        <ASSIGN rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                           <rdf:value>=</rdf:value> 
                           <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                              <rdf:value>sock</rdf:value> 
                           </IDENT> 
                           <CLASS_CONSTRUCTOR_CALL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                              <rdf:value>STATIC_ARRAY_CREATOR</rdf:value> 
                              <QUALIFIED_TYPE_IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                 <rdf:value>QUALIFIED_TYPE_IDENT</rdf:value> 
                                 <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                    <rdf:value>Socket</rdf:value> 
                                 </IDENT> 
                              </QUALIFIED_TYPE_IDENT> 
                              <ARGUMENT_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                 <rdf:value>ARGUMENT_LIST</rdf:value> 
                                 <EXPR rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                    <rdf:value>EXPR</rdf:value> 
                                    <STRING_LITERAL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                      <rdf:value>"host.example.org"</rdf:value> 
                                    </STRING_LITERAL> 
                                 </EXPR> 
                                 <EXPR rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                    <rdf:value>EXPR</rdf:value> 
                                    <DECIMAL_LITERAL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                                       <rdf:value>39544</rdf:value> 
                                    </DECIMAL_LITERAL> 
                                 </EXPR> 
                              </ARGUMENT_LIST> 
                           </CLASS_CONSTRUCTOR_CALL> 
                        </ASSIGN> 
                     </EXPR> 
                  </BLOCK_SCOPE> 
               </VOID_METHOD_DECL> 
            </CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE> 
         </CLASS> 
      </unit> 
   </rdf:Description> 
</rdf:RDF> 
Listing 16 Code pattern: sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); in RDF/XML 
The output in RDF/XML is traversed using the NxParser Java library
37
, a parser for the N3 
format.  While traversing the output, the nodes in triples are checked against the contents 
of the Variables or Wildcards arrays. The output of this step, concerning the code pattern 
in the given example, after the extra statements removal is shown in Listing 17. The ? 
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symbol in the Jena syntax is used to create anonymous nodes. The numbers (i.e. 
A744806, A744807) are automatically generated by the Java parser libraries. There are 
two wildcards: ?wildcard56 and ?wildcard77 and one variable: ?entry_point. 
The Jena rule corresponds to the code pattern: ?entry_point = new 
Socket(?wildcard56, ?wildcard77);, where the variables and wildcards are 
explicitly shown. 
The RDF predicates, e.g. fc:EXPR, fc:DECIMAL_LITERAL, fc:IDENT etc., where 
the namespace fc=http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol, are created on the 
fly, derived from the description of the language grammar. A discussion on vocabularies 
and the FC vocabulary was given in Section 2.3.1. The process of representing source code 
using RDF and the ANTLR language grammars was described in Section 3.3. 
@prefix fc: http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/ 
@prefix rdf: http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#  
[rule: 
(?A744806   fc:CLASS_CONSTRUCTOR_CALL   ?A744807 ), 
(?A744807   fc:ARGUMENT_LIST   ?A744808 ), 
(?A744808   fc:EXPR   ?A744809 ), 
(?A744810   rdf:value   ?wildcard56 ), 
(?A744809   fc:DECIMAL_LITERAL   ?A744810 ), 
(?A744808   fc:EXPR   ?A744811 ), 
(?A744812   rdf:value   ?wildcard77 ), 
(?A744811   fc:STRING_LITERAL   ?A744812 ), 
(?A744808   rdf:value   "ARGUMENT_LIST" ), 
(?A744807   fc:QUALIFIED_TYPE_IDENT   ?A744813 ), 
(?A744814   rdf:value   "Socket" ), 
(?A744813   fc:IDENT   ?A744814 ), 
(?A744815   rdf:value   ?entry_point ), 
(?A744806   fc:IDENT   ?A744815 ), 
(?A744806   rdf:value   "=" ) -> 
(fc:unit   fc:socket_entry_point   ?entry_point)] 
Listing 17 Jena rule for the sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); code pattern 
The inferred statement in a situation where a match is found is: (fc:unit 
fc:socket_entry_point “sock”), because the Jena variable ?entry_point 
matched the Java variable sock that contains the tainted data. This statement is analyzed 
in the interpreting the deduction model stage and additional steps are taken. More details 
about this stage in the process of finding vulnerabilities is given in 4.2.4. 
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4.2.3. Inference 
It was mentioned that the three main phases described in Section 4.1 follow the same path, 
which is illustrated using a graph in Figure 17. All phases, entry points identification, 
tracing information flow and vulnerability detection have three stages: rule creation, 
inference and interpreting the deduction model. 
The second stage is the inference stage. This stage tries to match patterns of code using the 
rules created in the first stage. In case of a found match, the result is the inference of new 
statements. On the contrary, if no match was found, there are no new inferred statements. 
A Semantic Web reasoner is created using the Jena rule set corresponding to the phase that 
is being processed and a chosen configuration for the inference engine. For this thesis 
approach, the forward chaining engine with the RETE algorithm is used and Section 4.2.1 
explains why this configuration was chosen. Listing 18 shows the Java code for creating 
the reasoner used in the proposed methodology. 
Model m = ModelFactory.createDefaultModel(); 
Resource configuration =  m.createResource(); 
configuration.addProperty(ReasonerVocabulary.PROPruleMode,      
        "forwardRETE"); 
configuration.addProperty(ReasonerVocabulary.PROPruleSet, 
        rules_filename); 
 
// Create an instance of such a reasoner 
Reasoner reasoner = GenericRuleReasonerFactory. 
                    theInstance().create(configuration); 
Listing 18 Creating a generic rule reasoner using the Jena framework 
Two inputs are required for the inference process: the reasoner and the data. An inference 
model is created by associating the reasoner with a Jena Model. For the entry points 
identification phase the data represents the Web application’s source code in RDF. For the 
next two phases, the data represents the Web application’s source code in RDF plus 
inferred statements from the previous phase. For example, for the tracing information flow 
phase, the data represents the Web application’s source code in RDF plus the statements 
that were inferred in the entry points identification phase. This flow is illustrated using the 
“Add Results to Model” dotted line in Figure 17b. 
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This section follows the example from the previous section. The code is given below. After 
running the entry points identification phase and associating the data with the entry points 
rules, during the inference stage, a new statement is inferred, according to the rule written 
for the entry point: (fc:unit fc:socket_entry_point “sock”). The rule is 
available in the previous section. 
sock = new Socket("host.example.org", 39544); 
 
/* read input from socket */ 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
The name of the predicate socket_entry_point is used for interpreting the results in 
the next stage. For tracing the sock variable, this predicate is changed to trace_var 
and a new RDF triple is created and added to the data. The new statement to add to the 
model is: (fc:unit fc:trace_var “sock”).  The rule generated for the 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
code line is given in Listing 19, which corresponds to the assignment ?new_trace_var 
= new InputStreamReader(?trace_var.getInputStream()); , where 
Variables and Wildcards are used. There are no Wildcards used in this instance. 
@prefix fc: http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/ 
@prefix rdf: http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#  
[assignment_rule: 
(fc:unit fc:trace_var ?trace_var), 
(?A747941   fc:CLASS_CONSTRUCTOR_CALL   ?A747942 ), 
(?A747942   fc:ARGUMENT_LIST   ?A747943 ), 
(?A747943   fc:EXPR   ?A747944 ), 
(?A747944   fc:METHOD_CALL   ?A747945 ), 
(?A747945   fc:DOT   ?A747946 ), 
(?A747947   fc:value   "getInputStream" ), 
(?A747946   fc:IDENT   ?A747947 ), 
(?A747948   fc:value   ?trace_var ), 
(?A747946   fc:IDENT   ?A747948 ), 
(?A747946   fc:value   "." ), 
(?A747942   fc:QUALIFIED_TYPE_IDENT   ?A747949 ), 
(?A747950   rdf:value   "InputStreamReader" ), 
(?A747949   fc:IDENT   ?A747950 ), 
(?A747951   rdf:value   ?new_trace_var ), 
(?A747941   fc:IDENT   ?A747951 ), 
(?A747941   rdf:value   "=" ) -> 
(fc:unit fc:new_trace_var ?new_trace_var)]  
Listing 19 Jena rule for the instrread = new 
InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); code assignment 
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The new RDF triple that was added in the entry points identification phase (e.g. 
(fc:unit fc:trace_var “sock”)) is going to match the triple (fc:unit 
fc:trace_var ?trace_var), in the rule from Listing 19, and in case of a match 
using the assignment rule, the new inferred statement will be (fc:unit 
fc:new_trace_var “instrread”).  Therefore, the new variable instrread 
needs tracing. In order to trace the new variable, the same inference process is used. As 
mentioned in Section 4.1.2 this process is repeated until the end of the trace is reached. If 
there are no more variables to trace, the last variable traced is checked to see if it is used in 
a potentially dangerous operation. This last phase will apply the same inference 
mechanism, by associating the source code in RDF with the rules created for the dangerous 
operations patterns and the new statements inferred in the tracing information flow phase.  
4.2.4. Interpreting the Deduction Model 
At the end of every phase, (e.g. entry points identification, tracing information flow and 
vulnerability detection) decisions are made based on the deduction model resulting from 
applying the inference mechanism. Using the Jena framework, the deduction model is 
accessed by employing the InfModel interface’s getDeductionsModel38 method. 
This deduction model is a graph containing the triples added to the base graph due to rule 
firings and thus, only inferred statements are included in this graph without the raw data 
used to derive information.   
Depending on the size of the deduction model and the phase that is currently processed, 
different actions are taken. If the deduction model is empty, then no actions are taken. For 
example, if the entry points identification phase does not find a match against any entry 
points rule, then it is concluded that the Web application under test does not use any data 
from outside the application, and thus, it is a secure application with regards to the 
proposed methodology. If the deduction model includes statements such as (fc:unit 
fc: socket_entry_point “sock”) then the action taken will be to trace these 
variables during the next phase (i.e. tracing information flow). 
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The deduction model is also used for printing out messages to the tester. For example, 
Listing 20 shows a typical console output of the testing method during the tracing 
information flow phase: 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/socket_entry_point, "sock"] 
Tracing variable: sock 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/new_trace_var, "instrread"] 
Tracing variable: instrread 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/new_trace_var, "buffread"] 
Tracing variable: buffread 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/new_trace_var, "data"] 
Tracing variable: data 
Reached the end of trace with variable: data 
Listing 20 Console output example for the tracing information flow phase 
In the vulnerability detection phase, the deduction model from the tracing information flow 
phase will be used to determine which variable needs to be checked against usage in a 
potentially dangerous operation. In the example from Listing 20, the end of the trace was 
reached with the data variable and thus, the next phase will use this variable to match 
dangerous operations pattern rules against the raw model. If matches are found, the console 
messages will be similar to the ones from Listing 21. 
Use of variable in dangerous operations: 
 
Type of vuln: sqlinjection 
SQL_statement_name: "sqlstatement" 
Variable_used: "data" 
End of use in dangerous operations 
Listing 21 Console output example for the vulnerability detection phase 
In this case, vulnerable patterns were found and thus, the proposed methodology will 
conclude that the code is vulnerable to the type of attack for which the pattern had a match.  
The deduction model is thus used as input for the next phase, as well as for printing 
messages to the console in order to provide input to users of the testing application. 
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4.3. Sub-graph Generalization 
Jena rules can be used to infer additional statements that can match more patterns than the 
ones identified in the training data using sub-graph generalization, i.e. by training the 
methodology to not distinguish between two argument lists with different formats, for 
example. We will next consider the Java code lines in Listing 22 used for tracing 
information flow. The Java code lines were taken from the NIST website previously 
mentioned in Section 4.2.2 for generating Jena rules.  
Code patterns for tracing information flow: 
1. instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
2. fIn = new File(root + data); 
Listing 22 Code patterns for tracing information flow 
In line 1, there is a flow of data from the sock variable to the instrread variable. 
During the tracing information flow phase, the instrread variable will be the new 
variable to trace. In line 2, the flow of data is from the data variable to the fIn variable 
and in this case, fIn becomes the new variable to trace. These lines of code are modelled 
using the RDF graphs from Figure 19 and Figure 20, respectively. The graphs are using the 
Notation 3 format for the anonymous node (e.g. the _: namespace). 
When generating the Jena rules, it was mentioned that the wildcards and variables are 
assigned manually. In Listing 23 the patterns, including wildcards and variables, used for 
generating the corresponding Jena rules are listed. We chose the same name for wildcards 
in order to highlight the similarity between the two code patterns.  
Jena rules patterns for tracing information flow: 
1. ?new_trace_var = new ?wildcard2(?trace_var.?wildcard1()); 
2. ?new_trace_var = new ?wildcard2(?wildcard1 + ?trace_var); 
Listing 23 Jena rules patterns for tracing information flow 
The value of constructor names and method names can be replaced with wildcards because 
when tracing information flow we need to determine only if there is a flow of data from 
one variable to another and not the methods employed to achieve this. Figure 21 depicts 
the RDF graph used to model the Jena rules for the analyzed code patterns. 
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Note that the graphs are similar, with the exception of the RDF graph part that models the 
called method’s argument list. However, using reasoning, a Jena rule can be used to infer 
additional statements that can match both patterns using only the Jena rule for matching 
the instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
code pattern. 
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Figure 19 instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); modelled 
using an RDF graph 
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Figure 20 fIn = new File(root + data); modelled using an RDF graph 
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Figure 21 RDF graph modelling the Jena rule pattern for matching instrread = new 
InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); and fIn = new File(root + data); 
We assume that tracing information flow contains only one Jena rule matching the pattern 
fIn = new File(root + data); and that the Web application under test uses the 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); 
code to assign values from the sock variable to the instrread variable. When testing 
the Web application for security vulnerabilities the proposed methodology must match the 
instrread = new InputStreamReader(sock.getInputStream()); code 
as an information flow pattern. However, the training data does not include a Jena rule to 
match this pattern.  
[rule: 
(?A1 <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/METHOD_CALL> ?A2 ), 
(?A2 <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/DOT> ?A3 ) -> 
(?A1   <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/PLUS> ?A3)] 
Listing 24 Jena rule to enable sub-graph generalization 
Next, consider the Jena rule in Listing 24. Jena rules use the ? character for anonymous 
nodes. When this Jena rule is associated with the raw data that includes the instrread 
= new InputStreamReader (sock.getInputStream()); code it will infer 
a new statement, as it finds a match for the rule antecedent. The inferred rule (e.g. ?A1   
<http://oanaureche.com/ flowcontrol/PLUS> ?A3) will be added to the 
raw model, thus allowing for matching the instrread = new 
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InputStreamReader(sock. getInputStream()); pattern with the Jena rule 
generated for the fIn = new File(root + data); pattern. 
This sub-graph generalization capability was employed throughout the methodology in 
order to enable not straightforward matching. The results of writing Jena rules to enable 
sub-graph generalization will be discussed in Section 5.2.2. 
This chapter described the methodology for detecting Web application vulnerabilities by 
employing Semantic Web reasoning and Jena rules over the source code represented in 
RDF. The results of this methodology are described in Chapter 5. The limitation of this 
methodology is described in Section 6.3. Other limitations, caused by the RETE algorithm 
and the language grammars are described in Section 6.1 and 6.2. However, they affect only 
the creation of rules stage. 
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5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
This chapter summarizes experimental results for the static analysis method described in 
Chapter 4. The analysis is applied to a set of real-world open source Java and PHP 
applications. The applications were chosen based on the availability of the source code, 
publicity of their security issues and the language used for implementation (PHP and Java). 
Prior to applying the proposed method to real-world applications, we used collections of 
test cases in the Java and PHP language as training data for our system. This chapter starts 
with the description of the training data.  
Comparing the proposed methodology with existing work in terms of accuracy and 
efficiency has been considered. This comparison was not a viable solution, due to the 
related works either not being applied to real-world applications, such as JFlow (Myers, 
1999) and Flow Caml (Simonet & Rocquencourt, 2003) or not explicitly stating which 
vulnerabilities were detected or not detected, such as RESIN (Yip, Wang, Zeldovich, & 
Kaashoek, 2009). In the first case, the authors focused on how to implement assertions to 
detect vulnerabilities and compared their solutions based on improved functionality over 
previous works. In the latter case, the authors applied their solution to existing Web 
applications, but they did not include specific references to the Web vulnerabilities found 
(e.g. using links from the CVE website).  
Our methodology is applied to existing Web applications and explicitly states the CVE 
number for every Web vulnerability, whether discovered or not discovered. As opposed to 
other woks, the experimental results use direct links to the discovered vulnerabilities. The 
ones that are not discovered are also linked to published vulnerabilities and reasons why 
they were not detected are individually given.  
5.1. Training Data 
It was mentioned in Section 4.2.2 that the Jena rules were created from patterns of code. 
We chose the test cases
39
 that are made available by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) to identify these patterns. This website includes a collection of test 
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 http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/testsuite.php 
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cases in several programming languages. It contains examples of various injection issues 
and tainted data mishandling, including input triggering the vulnerability.  
These test cases provided patterns for all three types of rules: entry points identification, 
tracing information flow and vulnerability detection. Examples of these types of patterns 
were previously given in Section 4.1. The resulting Jena rule sets are used by the inference 
mechanism to match patterns in a Web application’s source code. The reasoning 
methodology description is described in Section 4.2. 
Table 2 gives information about the training data used for the static code analysis. 
Although the NIST website includes test cases for other types of vulnerabilities, for the 
training data we chose the most common vulnerabilities caused by improper 
implementation of control flow methods. The most common vulnerabilities were identified 
in Section 1.1.1. Table 2 is sorted according to the proportion of the vulnerabilities 
identified as the most common. The chart illustrating their proportion was given in Figure 
4 from Section 1.1.1. For clarity, the chart is duplicated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
12% 
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10% 
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8% 
2% 
SQL Injection
Cross-site scripting
Code injection
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Table 2 Training data for static code analysis 
Vulnerability type Files Blank lines Lines of 
Comments 
Lines of Code 
SQL Injection 
(CWE89) 
2,024 76,134 79,544 695,620 
XSS (CWE80) 506 9,779 13,653 46,298 
XSS Error Message 
(CWE81) 
506 9,779 14,500 46,298 
XSS Attribute 
(CWE83) 
506 9,779 13,653 46,298 
HTTP Response 
Splitting (CWE113) 
2,024 54,564 79,544 305,274 
Information Leak 
Error (CWE209) 
508 13,351 17,806 90,253 
Absolute Path 
Traversal (CWE36) 
506 9,779 13,653 47,651 
Relative Path Traversal 
(CWE23) 
506 9,779 13,653 48,498 
Cross Site Request 
Forgery (CWE352) 
140 4,002 6,814 18,792 
OS Command Injection 
(CWE78) 
506 10,626 15,347 52,227 
Total 7,728 207,337 268,015 1,396,395 
 
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) (community-developed dictionary of 
software weakness types)
40
 classifies software weaknesses using numbers and Table 2 
includes the CWE number classification for the Web application vulnerabilities listed. 
Note that a cross-site scripting (XSS) attack can have several causes and they are classified 
under different CWE types. A cross-site scripting attack can be caused by an improper 
neutralization of scripts in attributes in a webpage, corresponding to the CWE-83 software 
weakness and one possible code pattern is response.getWriter(). 
println("<br>bad() - <img src=\"" + data + "\">"); where input is 
not verified before used in an image tag. Another cause for a cross-site scripting attack can 
                                                          
40
 http://cwe.mitre.org/ 
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be an error message sent to the client containing input that is not sanitized, such as 
response.sendError(404, "<br>bad() - Parameter name has 
value " + data);. 
The CLOC
41
 tool was employed to count the number of files, blank lines, comments and 
lines of code, as it provides the tools necessary to analyze a Web application’s source code. 
5.1.1. False Positives 
During the training process, false positives were observed, however with no impact over 
the accuracy of the methodology. The correct type of vulnerability was still identified. 
[sqlinjection:   
 (fc:unit fc:trace_var ?trace_var), 
 (?A1 :METHOD_CALL ?A2), 
     (?A2 :DOT ?A3), 
     (?A3 :IDENT ?A4), 
     (?A3 :IDENT ?A5), 
     (?A4 rdf:value ?sqlStatement_name), 
    (?A5 rdf:value "execute"),   
     (?A2 :ARGUMENT_LIST ?A6), 
     (?A6 :EXPR ?A7), 
     (?A7 :PLUS ?A8), 
     (?A8 :PLUS ?A9), 
     (?A9 :IDENT ?A10), 
     (?A10 rdf:value ?trace_var) -> 
     (fc:unit fc:sql_injection_statement ?sqlStatement_name) 
 (fc:unit fc:sql_injection_with_var ?trace_var)] 
Listing 25 Jena rule for a SQL injection dangerous operation pattern 
We will demonstrate false positives using an example. In the case of a SQL injection with 
the following dangerous operation code pattern: bResult = 
sqlstatement.execute("insert into users (status) values 
('updated') where surname = '"+data+"'"); the corresponding generated 
Jena rule is given in Listing 25. 
For clarity, the generated numbers for the anonymous nodes have been reduced to one and 
two digits size numbers and the RDF graph for this rule is given in Figure 22. Note the 
paths that are highlighted using the colors red and green.  
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Figure 22 RDF graph for SQL injection dangerous operation code pattern 
The inference engine makes no distinction between these paths as they use the same triple 
structure (?Anon1 predicate ?Anon2), where the predicate value is the same. Thus, 
when inferring new data the Jena inference mechanism will infer two statements for the 
(fc:unit fc:sql_injection_statement ?sqlStatement_name) part of 
the Jena rule antecedent, given in the listing below. 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/sql_injection_statement, "execute"] 
 
Inferred statement: [http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/unit, 
http://www.oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/sql_injection_statement, "sqlstatement"] 
Listing 26 Application output illustrating false positives 
Although the inference engine infers an extra statement that represents a false positive, it 
does however identify the correct name for the SQL statement variable.   
The issue that causes false positives in this case can be overcome by modifications to the 
language grammar and making the distinction that sqlstatement is an object, whilst 
execute is a method. The :IDENT predicate could then be replaced by :OBJECT, and 
:METHOD respectively. However, the modification of language grammars falls out of the 
scope of this thesis. 
5.2. Static Analysis Results 
Experimental results were obtained by applying our proposed methodology to real-world 
applications with known vulnerabilities. These Web application security vulnerabilities are 
published for the application’s older versions. For example, the Apache Tomcat website 
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publishes its older version’s vulnerabilities on their “Reporting security problems” page42. 
It was possible to download previous versions of these applications and run our 
methodology on their source code. Results were compared against their known security 
vulnerabilities. 
5.2.1. Summary of Discovered Vulnerabilities 
The real-world applications used for the experimental phase were: Apache Tomcat
43
, 
OpenEMR
44
, phpMyAdmin
45
, Jetty
46
, Quick & Dirty PHPSource Printer
47
, WebCollab
48
 
and Moodle
49
. These applications offer access to their source code and they are developed 
in Java and PHP. Not all applications’ websites contain the details of their security 
vulnerabilities. However, it was still possible to obtain their list of security vulnerabilities 
using an interface to CVE vulnerability data
50
. The data are taken from the NVD (National 
Vulnerability Database) XML feeds provided by NIST. For example, Moodle’s SQL 
injection security vulnerability list is available here
51
. 
The proposed methodology was only able to identify types of vulnerabilities and patterns 
used in the training data for entry points identification, tracing information flow and 
dangerous operations. The pattern-based limitation is explained in Section 6.3. It was 
however possible to identify vulnerabilities with similar patterns of code using wildcards 
and sub-graph generalization. The impact of using wildcards and sub-graph generalization 
is described in Section 5.2.2. The sub-graph generalization concept is explained in Section 
4.3.  
Table 3 shows the number and type for each identified vulnerability, as well as the entry 
points source for the tainted data. The rows specify the entry point source. The 
                                                          
42
 http://tomcat.apache.org/security.html 
43
 http://tomcat.apache.org/index.html 
44
 http://www.open-emr.org/ 
45
 http://www.phpmyadmin.net/home_page/index.php 
46
 http://www.eclipse.org/jetty/ 
47
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 http://www.cvedetails.com/ 
51
 http://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-2105/product_id-3590/opsqli-1/Moodle-
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vulnerability type is shown in columns. The table’s data represents the number of 
vulnerabilities found for each type of entry point. 
Table 3 Classification of vulnerabilities found 
 Cross-site 
scripting 
SQL injection Directory 
traversal 
HTTP response 
splitting 
HTML form fields 17 4 1 1 
URL manipulation 0 0 1 0 
Parameter tampering 1 1 0 0 
Non-Web input 4 0 1 0 
 
Vulnerabilities caused by improper sanitization of HTML form fields are the most 
common ones. An example of a SQL injection vulnerability found in OpenEMR
52
 allowed 
malicious users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the u parameter. The vulnerable 
code is given in Listing 27. 
$user = $_GET['u']; 
 
$authDB = sqlQuery("select password,length(password) as 
passlength from users where username = " + $user + "'"); 
Listing 27 OpenEMR vulnerable code snippet 
Web applications were also found to use non-Web input that can trigger certain attacks. 
For example, phpMyAdmin was found to be vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack 
through importing a file, the name of which was used later for output in a webpage. By 
using a crafted name for the file name, it is possible to trigger a cross-site scripting attack. 
However, only someone logged into phpMyAdmin can trigger this vulnerability. The same 
application was used to echo a file’s content without sanitizing it. A cross-site scripting 
attack via parameter tampering could have been triggered in earlier versions of 
phpMyAdmin, through a crafted logo URL in the navigation panel. These vulnerabilities 
are assigned the same CVE identifier
53
. 
                                                          
52
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2012-2115 
53
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2013-4996 
98 
 
URL manipulation was able to be performed on the Jetty Web server by making HTTP 
requests as the following: http://jetty-server:8080/cgi-bin/..\..\..\ 
..\..\..\winnt/notepad.exe, causing a directory traversal attack
54
. However, 
URL manipulation was commonly implemented through HTTP parameters. For example, a 
SQL vulnerability
55
 in Moodle was caused by not sanitizing the id URL parameter. 
Although other types of vulnerabilities found in the applications under test were not 
detected, due to the training data not containing patterns for these types of vulnerabilities, 
we found that our proposed methodology could have been successfully applied in other 
instances. For example, older versions of the Jetty HTTP server allow attackers to cause a 
denial of service using HTTP requests with a large Content-Length. In order to detect this 
vulnerability, input read through HTTP requests should be checked if used unsanitized in a 
denial of service dangerous operation. 
Details of discovered/not discovered vulnerabilities  
This section provides detailed information on the type of vulnerabilities found, together 
with the vulnerabilities that were not detected. Reasons why some vulnerabilities were not 
detected are given next. 
The Web application phpMyAdmin, version 3.5.5 contains nine cross-site scripting 
vulnerabilities. The proposed methodology was able to detect eight. The vulnerability that 
was not detected is assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2013-5002
56
 and it uses a non-
sanitized public variable, specifically public $pageNumber;, to echo a message on the 
Web page. However, the value for this variable is assigned in a different script and the 
methodology does not trace information flow across different programming scripts. 
PhpMyAdmin 3.5.5 includes one SQL injection vulnerability, assigned the CVE number 
CVE-2013-5003
57
, which has been detected by the proposed methodology. There are no 
directory traversal or HTTP response splitting vulnerabilities reported and the other 
                                                          
54
 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2002-1178 
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reported vulnerabilities (e.g. bypass authentication, DoS) were not used in the training 
data. 
OpenEMR 4.1.0 contains one SQL injection and one cross-site scripting vulnerability. 
These vulnerabilities were detected. No path traversal or HTTP response splitting 
vulnerabilities were reported. A code execution vulnerability, assigned the CVE identifier 
CVE-2011-5161
58
, was reported, but the methodology could not detect it, due to the code 
pattern missing from the training data. The vulnerability is caused by an unrestricted file 
upload. This pattern of entry points identification is not currently available as a Jena rule, 
although it is possible to generate a Jena rule for matching a file upload entry point pattern. 
Three vulnerabilities were reported for the Jetty Web server, version 4.0.0. The directory 
traversal vulnerability was detected by the proposed methodology. The other two 
vulnerabilities were not detected, as their types, (e.g. bypass authentication and DoS) were 
not included in the training data. It is possible to detect the DoS
59
 vulnerability as it allows 
attackers to cause a denial of service using HTTP requests with a large Content-Length. In 
order to detect this vulnerability, input read through HTTP requests should be checked if 
used unsanitized in a denial of service dangerous operation.  
In Apache Tomcat 6.0.0, eight cross-site scripting vulnerabilities were reported. The 
proposed methodology was able to identify four of them. Of the others, three cross-site 
scripting vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-0781
60
, CVE-2007-2449
61
, CVE-2007-1355
62
) were 
found in JSP files. Although possible to detect vulnerabilities in other scripting language, 
to the best of our knowledge there are no ANTLR grammars available for parsing JSP 
source code. The fourth non-detected vulnerability
63
 was due to an unsanitized variable 
used in a dangerous operation. However, the value is read in another class and current 
methodology does not trace information flow across different programming scripts. One 
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directory traversal was accurately identified. The remaining two directory traversal 
vulnerabilities (CVE-2009-2902
64
, CVE-2009-2693
65
) used cross-script information. 
There is no SQL injection and HTTP response splitting vulnerability reported for Apache 
Tomcat 6.0.0. Most vulnerabilities are of type DoS, bypass authentication and gain 
privileges which were not used in the training data.  
Quick & Dirty PHPSource Printer 1.1 reported only one directory traversal vulnerability
66
, 
which was correctly identified by the proposed methodology. 
WebCollab 3.30 reported one security vulnerability: an HTTP response splitting
67
. This 
vulnerability allows attackers to conduct response splitting attacks via an item parameter 
read through an HTML form.  
Moodle version 1.9.1 was reported to be vulnerable to four SQL injection attacks, out of 
which three were identified by the proposed methodology. The fourth vulnerability
68
 was 
not discovered due to the entry points pattern (e.g. file upload) not available as a Jena rule. 
Most cross-site scripting vulnerabilities reported in Moodle 1.9.1 are due to unsanitized 
input read through HTML forms and used on output
69
. This information flow is typical for 
a cross-site scripting vulnerability and thus, the proposed methodology was trained for this 
type of situation. Although the code follows a typical flow for an XSS vulnerability, the 
methodology could not detect vulnerabilities
70
 caused by unsanitized input read using a 
for loop (e.g. foreach($_GET as $var => $val)) as this pattern of entry point 
was not included in the training data. The proposed methodology identified 56% (9 out of 
16) of the XSS vulnerabilities reported for Moodle 1.9.1.  
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Figure 23 Accuracy of proposed method 
Figure 23 illustrates the accuracy of the proposed method. As described throughout this 
section, most of the vulnerabilities that were not discovered are due to the methodology not 
previously being trained with appropriate rules for vulnerability patterns and entry points, 
as well as vulnerabilities found in different programming/scripting languages (e.g. JSP) 
than the ones used for the proof of concept. The pattern-based limitation is explained in 
Section 6.3. In Apache Tomcat 6.0.0, another limitation of the proposed methodology was 
found. Specifically, the current methodology cannot trace information flow across different 
programming scripts. 
5.2.2. Impact of Using Wildcards and Sub-graph Generalization  
Section 4.2.2 introduces the concept of wildcards and variables used when generating Jena 
rules. Section 4.3 describes how employing Jena rules can enable the generalization of 
RDF sub-graphs. This section illustrates the impact of using wildcards and sub-graph 
generalization capabilities on the results of the methodology.  
The methodology’s training data included the dangerous operation code pattern in Listing 
28. This operation can enable a cross-site scripting attack if the data parameter is not 
properly sanitized. This code pattern can be modelled using the graph in Figure 24. We 
intentionally omitted the statements that model the message "<br>bad() - Parameter 
name has value" as they do not offer any value in matching the code pattern. 
83.33% 
70.59% 
60.00% 
100.00% 
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Moreover, by omitting these statements, other patterns using different messages can be 
matched. 
res.getWriter().println("<br>bad() - Parameter name has value" +       
                data);  
Listing 28 Dangerous operation that might enable an XSS vulnerability 
_:A1
:EXPR
_:A8
:A
RG
U
M
EN
T_
LI
ST
_:A9
_:A7
:ID
EN
T
:rdf:value
“println”
:PLUS
_:A10
:IDENT
“data”_:A11
rdf:value
_:A2
:DO
T
:METHOD_CALL
_:A3 _:A4
:DOT
:ID
EN
T “getWriter”_:A6
rdf:value
“res”_:A5
rdf:value
:IDENT
Statements omitted
…..
 
Figure 24 res.getWriter().println("<br>bad() - Parameter name has value" + 
data); modelled using an RDF graph 
This code pattern will be matched using the Jena rule modelled by an RDF graph in Figure 
25. The ?trace_var node matches the data parameter, used in a potentially dangerous 
operation that can enable a cross-site scripting attack. For the object name and the print 
method, we used wildcards. 
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:EXPR
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:A
RG
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M
EN
T_
LI
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_:A3
_:A10
:ID
EN
T
:rdf:value
?wildcard1
:PLUS
_:A7
:IDENT
?trace_var_:A8
rdf:value
_:A11
:DO
T
:METHOD_CALL
_:A12 _:A13
:DOT
:ID
EN
T “getWriter”_:A15
rdf:value
?wildcard2_:A15
rdf:value
:IDENT
 
Figure 25 Jena rule modelling the code pattern res.getWriter().println("<br>bad() - 
Parameter name has value" + data); 
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The Jena rule in Listing 29 was written during the training phase to enable sub-graph 
generalization. Using this rule, the pattern shown in Figure 26 can be matched along with 
the pattern used in the training data. 
[rule: 
 (?A1 <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/METHOD_CALL>     ?A2 ), 
 (?A2 <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/ARGUMENT_LIST> ?A3 ), 
 (?A3 <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/EXPR>   ?A4 ) -> 
 (?A1   <http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/PLUS>   ?A4)] 
Listing 29 Jena rule enables sub-graph generalization 
Therefore, by associating the raw model with the Jena rule that generalizes sub-graphs, the 
operation in Listing 30 was identified as a potentially dangerous operation in a real-world 
application. The args argument is traced and echoed unsanitized to the user of the 
application. We intentionally omitted the statements that include the MessageFormat 
settings, as these statements are not necessary in matching the dangerous operation pattern. 
_:A1
:EXPR
_:A2
:A
RG
U
M
EN
T_
LI
ST
_:A3
_:A10
:ID
EN
T
:rdf:value
“print”
_:A4
:METHOD_CALL :ARGUMENT_LIST :EXPR
_:A7
:IDENT
“args”_:A8
rdf:value
_:A6
_:A11
:DO
T
:METHOD_CALL
_:A12 _:A13
:DOT
:ID
EN
T “getWriter”_:A15
rdf:value
“response”_:A15
rdf:value
:IDENT
Statements omitted
…..
 
Figure 26 
response.getWriter().print(MessageFormat.format(MANAGER_HOST_ROW_BUTTON_S
ECTION, args)); modelled using an RDF graph 
response.getWriter().print(MessageFormat.format( 
          MANAGER_HOST_ROW_BUTTON_SECTION, args)); 
Listing 30 Dangerous operation found in real-world application 
The code from Listing 30 was identified as a dangerous operation in Apache Tomcat 
version 6.0.18, CVE-2008-1947
71
. A similar pattern was identified as a cross-site scripting 
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vulnerability in Apache Tomcat, versions 6.0.0-6.0.29, with the identifier CVE-2011-
0013
72
. 
5.2.3. Pattern-based Limitation 
This section describes a few concrete examples that we encountered in the experimental 
phase, during which the methodology was not able to match vulnerable code, including 
types of vulnerabilities that were part of the training data. 
The first example consists of a local path disclosure vulnerability in phpMyAdmin, 
identified internally using the security identifier PMASA-2012-2
73
.  
The revision code in Listing 31 shows the code lines that were removed, as well as the 
code lines that were added in order to mitigate this vulnerability. Removed lines are 
marked with a “-” sign and added lines are marked with a “+” sign. 
  /* Read config file. 
  */ 
-require CONFIG_FILE; 
+if (is_readable(CONFIG_FILE)) { 
+    require CONFIG_FILE; 
+} 
Listing 31 Revision code for path disclosure in phpMyAdmin 
The vulnerability appears in the show_config_errors.php. An error message can 
show the full path of the CONFIG_FILE, leading to possible further attacks. In order to 
avoid this, the presence of the configuration file must be validated. 
This snippet of vulnerable code does not follow an information flow type pattern, e.g. it 
does not contain a pattern for an entry point into the Web application and a method that 
uses tainted data, and thus, the methodology proposed cannot match this type of pattern. 
Another limitation of the methodology was encountered during the testing of the Moodle 
open-source learning platform. The disclosed vulnerability is assigned the identifier CVE-
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2012-2363
74
. It is a SQL injection vulnerability in calendar/event.php that allows 
attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via crafted form input. However, the form 
input is read using a method that is imported: $form = data_submitted();. 
Although the data contained in the $form is tainted and coming from untrusted sources 
outside the application, the vulnerable assignment is not matched by the proposed 
methodology. Currently, the proposed methodology does not trace user defined methods in 
order to detect vulnerabilities. 
5.2.4. Analysis Times 
This section shows the time necessary to analyze the real-world Web applications used in 
our experimental phase. Table 4 shows the duration, in seconds, for each Web application 
analyzed using the proposed methodology. The machine used for running the methodology 
uses an Intel Core i5 processor @ 2.67GHz and 4.00GB RAM (2.99GB usable). We used 
the same tool as the one mentioned in Section 5.1 (e.g. CLOC) for counting the lines of 
code, blank lines, comments and number of files. 
Table 4 Analysis duration of methodology 
Web 
application 
Files Blank 
lines 
Lines of 
Comments 
Lines of Code Time 
(seconds) 
Apache 
Tomcat 6.0.0 
1,056 52,756 103,687 154,602 4,429 
OpenEMR 
4.1.0 
2,130 71,542 84,075 451,352 10,651 
phpMyAdmin 
3.5.5 
338 11,862 36,325 116,958 976  
Jetty 4.2.27 440 14,665 31,022 58,131 779 
WebCollab 
3.30 
252 7,885 7,943 28,278 524 
Moodle 2.0.1 4,496 124,544 310,309 623,420 17,654 
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The analysis time data is plotted using a chart in Figure 27. The red, dashed line illustrates 
the ideal progression for duration in relation to the size of the application. For plotting the 
processing time, we chose the number of files in a Web application for the x-axis, as this 
number provides a good representation of the size of the data analyzed. Although blank 
lines are ignored by the proposed methodology, comments are modeled in the source code 
RDF graph and thus, the number of lines of code alone does not provide a good 
representation of the size of the data that is being analyzed. As shown in Figure 27 the 
processing time is in proportion with the size of the Web application being analyzed, 
resulting in an almost linear type graph. 
 
Figure 27 Analysis time in seconds for the number of files in a Web application 
Although, the analysis time grows linearly with the size of the Web application, there are 
exceptions, as described below. If more applications are to be considered for running the 
proposed methodology, the chart may not result to be linear. Whilst XML is time 
consuming, only one Web application file at the time is analyzed and thus, the analysis 
time does not grow exponentially for Web applications that contain significantly more files 
than other Web applications. Furthermore, the Jena rule sets representing patterns for entry 
points, information flow assignments and Web vulnerabilities are created prior to the 
application/detection phase, and thus not influencing the overhead of the work. 
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We have identified an exception concerning the linearity of the analysis time graph. For a 
Web application containing 338 files, the processing time was equal to 976 seconds, while 
for a Web application containing 440 files, there were required 779 seconds to analyze it. 
During the experimental phase, we have observed that, for example, to process the 
interface/main/calendar/includes/pntables.php file from the 
OpenEMR Web application, 70 seconds were required. This file’s size is 44KB. However, 
for the import.php file in the same folder, the time required to process it was one 
second. This file’s size is 21KB. However, the pntables.php file contains only arrays 
declarations, with no PHP code implementing functionality. Therefore, the structure of the 
contents of the source code files can affect the proposed methodology processing time.  
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6. LIMITATIONS IMPACT 
This chapter presents the impact of the limitations of this thesis’ approach to static code 
analysis. The limitations described in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 are caused by dependencies of 
our methodology, specifically the Jena forward engine using the RETE algorithm and the 
language grammars used by the ANTLR parser generator to extract source code facts. 
However, these issues only affect the rule creation process. During the detection of 
security vulnerabilities, runtime performance is not affected. The third limitation, 
described in Section 6.3 is a common limitation of methodologies that employ matching 
algorithms, in that they fail to match patterns that were not used in the training stage. 
However, adding more training data will result in fewer security vulnerabilities not being 
discovered. Furthermore, limitations of white-box testing compared to black-box testing 
are discussed in the last section.  
6.1. Unoptimized RETE Network 
During the development of the methodology, significant delays (approximately 10 seconds 
and more to reason using a single rule) and Java heap size memory errors in processing the 
inference model were observed. Further testing concluded that the order of the statements 
in the Jena rule affects the performance of the reasoning engine. 
These delays are caused by the compiling of rules into a crude RETE network within Jena 
(Reynolds, 2013). The shape of the network and distance between nodes depends on the 
order or the statements in the rule and thus, different intermediate joins with different 
queue lengths are expected, causing different processing times. Research is being 
conducted to improve the performance of a RETE-based inference engine (Özacar, Öztürk, 
& Ünalir, 2007). 
As an example, consider the rules in Listing 32 and Listing 33. Both Jena rules infer the 
name of the Java Connection
75
 object from the Java pattern: Connection conn = 
IO.getDBConnection(). Reasoning on a sample dataset using the Jena rule in 
Listing 33 takes approximately 2 seconds, compared to the Jena rule in Listing 32 that 
causes a delay of approximately 10 seconds on the same dataset. The Jena rule in Listing 
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32 was generated during the rule creation phase described in Section 4.2.2. The order of 
the RDF statements in the Jena rule from Listing 33 was optimized for better performance. 
[connection: 
  (?A3 :METHOD_CALL ?A4 ), 
  (?A2 rdf:value ?variable_conn ), 
  (?A1 :EXPR ?A3 ), 
  (?A6 rdf:value "getDBConnection" ), 
  (?A4 :DOT ?A5 ), 
  (?A5 :IDENT ?A6 ), 
  (?A5 :IDENT ?A7 ), 
  (?A7 rdf:value "IO" ), 
  (?A1 :IDENT ?A2 ), 
  (?A8 rdf:value "Connection" ) -> 
  (fc:unit fc:variable_conn ?variable_conn)] 
Listing 32 Generated Jena rule 
[connection: 
  (?A1 :IDENT ?A2 ), 
  (?A2 rdf:value ?variable_conn ), 
  (?A1 :EXPR ?A3 ), 
  (?A3 :METHOD_CALL ?A4 ), 
  (?A4 :DOT ?A5 ), 
  (?A5 :IDENT ?A6 ), 
  (?A5 :IDENT ?A7 ), 
  (?A7 rdf:value "IO" ), 
  (?A6 rdf:value "getDBConnection" ), 
  (?A8 rdf:value "Connection" ) -> 
  (fc:unit fc:variable_conn ?variable_conn)] 
Listing 33 Optimized Jena rule 
The statements in the optimized Jena rule have the smallest distance between them. For 
example, the first statement is linked to the second statement using the ?A2 blank node, 
the first statement is linked to the third statement using the ?A3 node and so on. In the 
generated Jena rule from Listing 32 the second statement is not linked to any adjacent RDF 
statement; the ?A2 node from the second statement, appears again only in the eighth 
statement, causing distance between nodes in the compiled RETE network and thus delays 
in the processing time. 
The optimization process was achieved using a service
76
 provided by the World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C). This service translates an RDF/XML representation into an N3 
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representation and outputs the RDF statements in an optimized order suitable for 
processing by the RETE network.   
This limitation affected the time required to generate Jena rules and caused overhead in 
terms of implementation design. However, using optimized Jena rules increases the Web 
application vulnerability’s runtime performance. It is worth mentioning that un-optimized 
Jena rules commonly resulted in an “out of memory” error, thus un-optimized Java rules 
was not a viable option. 
6.2. Language Grammars Requirement for Proper Language Syntax 
It was briefly mentioned in Section 4.2.2 that during the rule creation stage, we 
encountered a limitation when working with language grammars. In order to be able to 
parse Java code, for example to create an AST, the code must have a proper Java syntax 
(e.g. package name, class name, method declaration etc.). Therefore, although a rule is 
created for a single line of code, several other lines of code needed to be added first, in 
order to have a proper Java file that can be parsed and converted to RDF. This results in 
extra RDF statements, which need to be removed after the rule creation process. During 
this stage, most statements that are irrelevant for reasoning (e.g. the extra RDF statements) 
are removed. This limitation is illustrated next using a simple example. We assume that a 
Jena rule needs to be generated for the assignment a = 1;. Using the current Java 
grammar when employing the ANTLR parser generator for the code a = 1; throws the 
exception in Listing 34.  
org.xml.sax.SAXParseException: The content of elements must consist of 
well-formed character data or markup. 
2014-05-12 12:04:37 ERROR RDFDefaultErrorHandler:59 - (line 1 column 1): 
Content is not allowed in prolog. 
Listing 34 Exception when parsing code without proper syntax 
//proper Java syntax 
1. class Generic_class_name{ 
2.          public void generic_method_name() { 
3.                 a = 1; 
4.          } 
5. } 
Listing 35 Code pattern with proper Java syntax 
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<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"> 
   <rdf:Description rdf:about="http://www.oanaureche.com/unit"> 
      <unit xmlns="http://oanaureche.com/flowcontrol/"    
              rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
         <ANNOTATION_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
            <rdf:value>ANNOTATION_LIST</rdf:value> 
         </ANNOTATION_LIST> 
         <CLASS rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
            <rdf:value>class</rdf:value> 
            <MODIFIER_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>MODIFIER_LIST</rdf:value> 
            </MODIFIER_LIST> 
            <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>Generic_class_name</rdf:value> 
            </IDENT> 
            <CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
               <rdf:value>CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE</rdf:value> 
               <VOID_METHOD_DECL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                  <rdf:value>VOID_METHOD_DECL</rdf:value> 
                  <MODIFIER_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>MODIFIER_LIST</rdf:value> 
                     <PUBLIC rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                        <rdf:value>public</rdf:value> 
                     </PUBLIC> 
                  </MODIFIER_LIST> 
                  <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>generic_method_name</rdf:value> 
                  </IDENT> 
                  <FORMAL_PARAM_LIST rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>FORMAL_PARAM_LIST</rdf:value> 
                  </FORMAL_PARAM_LIST> 
                  <BLOCK_SCOPE rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                     <rdf:value>BLOCK_SCOPE</rdf:value> 
                     <EXPR rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                        <rdf:value>EXPR</rdf:value> 
                        <ASSIGN rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                           <rdf:value>=</rdf:value> 
                           <IDENT rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                              <rdf:value>a</rdf:value> 
                           </IDENT> 
                           <DECIMAL_LITERAL rdf:parseType="Resource"> 
                              <rdf:value>1</rdf:value> 
                           </DECIMAL_LITERAL> 
                        </ASSIGN> 
                     </EXPR> 
                  </BLOCK_SCOPE> 
               </VOID_METHOD_DECL> 
            </CLASS_TOP_LEVEL_SCOPE> 
         </CLASS> 
      </unit> 
   </rdf:Description> 
</rdf:RDF> 
Listing 36 RDF/XML representation with statements for proper Java syntax 
In order to fix the code for generating a Jena rule, the assignment needs to be enclosed in a 
proper Java program. A basic syntax shown in Listing 35, lines 1 to 5, will suffice. In this 
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case, however, when extracting source code facts necessary for generating the Jena rule, 
additional RDF statements are added to the RDF representation. The RDF statements 
necessary for generating a Jena rule corresponding to the pattern a = 1; are highlighted 
using the bold style in Listing 36. The remaining RDF statements represent the 
surrounding Java basic syntax. It is necessary for these statements to be removed as real 
world applications will have different names and access modifiers for classes and methods 
than the ones we used for generating the Jena rule (e.g. Generic_class_name and 
public generic_method_name). 
Although this limitation affects the overall performance when creating rules and caused 
overhead in terms of implementation design and time, it does not affect the runtime 
performance of the security vulnerability detection methodology, as this limitation’s issues 
are only dealt with in the rule creation phase. 
6.3. Pattern-Based Modelling and Static Code Analysis 
A common limitation of methods that employ matching techniques based on patterns 
(Parasoft, 2013 and Costanza, 2004) is the fact that they can only detect patterns that were 
used as training data or very similar to the training data when wildcards and sub-graph 
generalization are used. The impact of using wildcards and sub-graph generalization is 
discussed in Section 5.2.2. However, as the training data grows, the number of patterns that 
these methods cannot detect becomes less significant. 
During the experimental phase, when testing our methodology against real-world 
applications, patterns that our proposed methodology could not detect were observed. 
These patterns included Web application vulnerabilities that were not included in the 
training data. Concrete examples are given in Section 5.2.3. The training data consisted of 
the most common security vulnerabilities, mentioned in Section 1.1.1. Section 5.1 contains 
details of the training data used. 
Security vulnerabilities found in Web application’s security reports, such as Frame 
injection in Javadoc documentation discovered in Apache Tomcat 6.0.39, Digest 
Authentication weakness found in Apache Tomcat 6.0.36, and Local file inclusion 
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vulnerability in phpMyAdmin versions prior to 4.0.0, were not detected by our 
methodology, as the training data did not include patterns for these types of vulnerabilities.  
Furthermore, this thesis approach is a white-box testing approach and although the 
proposed methodology can detect a wide variety of security vulnerabilities, it is not 
possible to be trained to secure all aspects of a Web application. Section 1.1.3 shows that 
although white-box testing was able to detect more types of security vulnerabilities than 
black-box testing, some security vulnerabilities were only detected using a black-box 
testing approach. Static code analysis is also only possible when the source code of the 
Web application is available. Therefore, the methods proposed in this thesis should be used 
in conjunction with other approaches, such as black-box testing. 
Furthermore, we mentioned that only the last variable traced was used for testing against 
use in a potentially dangerous operation. Although it constitutes a limitation of the 
proposed methodology, it was not found necessary to check intermediary variables in the 
tracing information flow phase, as these were not used in dangerous operations during the 
training phase. This situation was also not encountered during the experimental phase. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This thesis provided a novel methodology for finding security vulnerabilities in Web 
applications. The methodology addresses a current limitation of previously proposed 
approaches: their dependence on the programming language of the Web application under 
test. 
To address this limitation, we proposed reasoning over source code represented 
independently of its programming language. The motives for using a Semantic reasoner 
were supported by previous research in the area of security. We have shown that reasoning 
with rules and ontologies in order to enforce security and integrity of information has been 
previously proposed in academia. Although the proposed frameworks do not apply to 
source code analysis, they provided the proof of concept that security can be enforced with 
the application of Semantic Web technologies. 
The representation chosen was the format the Semantic Web is built upon, specifically 
RDF. This format allows the methodology to employ Semantic Web technologies, and 
therefore, its inference capabilities. Although previous research proposed the conversion of 
source code to RDF, their result was a coarse-grained representation of source code facts, 
and static code analysis could have not been implemented. We thus, provided the 
following contributions: 
 An algorithm that converts source code into a common format that allows static 
code analysis independently of the input programming language  
 A method that represents source code facts with the finest granularity, suitable for 
implementing static code analysis 
 A novel approach that employs a Semantic reasoner to detect security 
vulnerabilities in Web applications 
The implementation of the source code extraction framework employs the ANTLR parser 
generator and language grammars to represent the source code using Abstract Syntax 
Trees. The ASTs are traversed into an XML document that is converted to RDF using 
XQuery. The language grammars caused limitations during the Jena rule creation stage, as 
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it required the code patterns to be enclosed in a program with proper syntax. Although this 
limitation caused delays in the implementation duration, it does not affect the performance 
of the vulnerability detection methodology. 
Jena rules were generated from three types of patterns of code, corresponding to the phases 
of the methodology: entry points identification, tracing information flow and vulnerability 
detection. These rules are associated with the source code model by the Semantic reasoner 
during testing of the Web application for security vulnerabilities.  Additional data is 
inferred if the patterns converted into Jena rules match code in the Web application turned 
into RDF. The pattern-based approach had a common limitation identifiable in static code 
analysis methods that use patterns to match data. Specifically, the methodology cannot 
match patterns that were not included in the training data. Although a known limitation of 
a pattern-based approach, using sub-graph generalization and wildcards we were able to 
match not only precise patterns, but also similar patterns, with no discovered false 
positives. 
False positives were caused when additional statements were inferred. These statements 
did not add any value to the results of the methodology.  However, they did not affect the 
accuracy of the methodology. We were still able to identify the correct type of 
vulnerability. 
The patterns for generating Jena rules were selected from the test cases made available by 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The patterns were selected for 
the most common vulnerabilities caused by improper implementation of control flow 
methods. These types of vulnerabilities were identified in the introduction chapter. 
In order to test the proposed methodology against real-world applications, we chose Web 
applications with known vulnerabilities. Although the methodology could not identify all 
the published security vulnerabilities, due to the pattern-based approach limitation and 
patterns that do not follow an information flow model (e.g. source-data flow-sink), we 
were still able to identify a substantial amount of Web application vulnerabilities. 
Detection of vulnerabilities was also limited due to variables values assigned through 
method calls, as this feature was not implemented.  
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Nevertheless, similar patterns not included in the training data were matched due to the 
implementation of reasoning using sub-graph generalization and wildcards. Furthermore, 
the objective of this research, e.g. a language independent method that detects security 
vulnerabilities in Web applications using a pattern-based approach, was met. 
7.1. Future work 
As a pattern-based approach, the methodology will be limited to detecting only the patterns 
for which the Jena rules were generated. Therefore, future work should include more 
training data that contains a larger variety of security vulnerabilities patterns and types. 
However, this may result in CPU overhead, as the methodology will need to find a match 
against a potentially large amount of data. Therefore, future work should also include ways 
to minimize the CPU overhead or to find a compromise between the size of the Jena rule 
set and the CPU processing power. 
Larger coverage of code can be achieved through analysis of method calls. For example, if 
the value of variable file is assigned using a method call, such as file = 
read_contents(), the methodology should analyze the contents of the 
read_contents() method. In an entry points identification phase, this method could 
return tainted data and thus, the file variable would need to be traced inside the 
application. However, this feature can cause CPU overhead as well. Assuming the 
read_contents() method is not defined in the current script file which includes 
dozens of imports. The static code analysis method would need to analyze the contents of 
every imported file for declaration of the read_contents()method. In this case, in 
order to save the CPU processing power, the methodology may choose not to trace this 
method. 
A useful feature of the proposed methodology is the capability to detect vulnerabilities 
across a system written in different programming languages. Although the methodology 
could be currently applied to such system, considering that the sub-systems interoperate 
and that the current methodology does not implement cross-script analysis, the proposed 
methodology is limited for a multi-language system. Future work should include a feature 
to enable the possibility of cross-script and cross-subsystem analysis. 
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APPENDIX 
PHP Grammar for ANTLR (Kuruvila, 2011) 
grammar Php; 
 
options { 
    backtrack = true;  
    memoize = true; 
    k=2; 
    output = AST; 
    ASTLabelType = CommonTree; 
} 
 
tokens{ 
    SemiColon = ';'; 
    Comma = ','; 
    OpenBrace = '('; 
    CloseBrace = ')'; 
    OpenSquareBrace = '['; 
    CloseSquareBrace = ']'; 
    OpenCurlyBrace = '{'; 
    CloseCurlyBrace = '}'; 
    ArrayAssign = '=>'; 
    LogicalOr = '||'; 
    LogicalAnd = '&&'; 
    ClassMember = '::'; 
    InstanceMember = '->'; 
    SuppressWarnings = '@'; 
    QuestionMark = '?'; 
    Dollar = '$'; 
    Colon = ':'; 
    Dot = '.'; 
    Ampersand = '&'; 
    Pipe = '|'; 
    Bang = '!'; 
    Plus = '+'; 
    Minus = '-'; 
    Asterisk = '*'; 
    Percent = '%'; 
    Forwardslash = '/';  
    Tilde = '~'; 
    Equals = '='; 
    New = 'new'; 
    Clone = 'clone'; 
    Echo = 'echo'; 
    If = 'if'; 
    Else = 'else'; 
    ElseIf = 'elseif'; 
    For = 'for'; 
    Foreach = 'foreach'; 
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    While = 'while'; 
    Do = 'do'; 
    Switch = 'switch'; 
    Case = 'case'; 
    Default = 'default'; 
    Function = 'function'; 
    Break = 'break'; 
    Continue = 'continue'; 
    //Goto = 'goto'; 
    Return = 'return'; 
    Global = 'global'; 
    Static = 'static'; 
    And = 'and'; 
    Or = 'or'; 
    Xor = 'xor'; 
    Instanceof = 'instanceof'; 
     
    Class = 'class'; 
    Interface = 'interface'; 
    Extends = 'extends'; 
    Implements = 'implements'; 
    Abstract = 'abstract'; 
    Var = 'var'; 
    Const = 'const'; 
    Modifiers; 
    ClassDefinition; 
     
    Block; 
    Params; 
    Apply; 
    Member; 
    Reference; 
    Empty; 
    Prefix; 
    Postfix; 
    IfExpression; 
    Label; 
    Cast; 
    ForInit; 
    ForCondition; 
    ForUpdate; 
    Field; 
    Method; 
} 
 
@header{ 
package net.kuruvila.php.parser;  
} 
@lexer::header{ 
package net.kuruvila.php.parser; 
} 
@lexer::members{ 
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    // Handle the first token, which will always be a BodyString. 
    public Token nextToken(){ 
        //The following code was pulled out from super.nextToken() 
        if (input.index() == 0) { 
            try { 
                state.token = null; 
                state.channel = Token.DEFAULT_CHANNEL; 
                state.tokenStartCharIndex = input.index(); 
                state.tokenStartCharPositionInLine = 
input.getCharPositionInLine(); 
                state.tokenStartLine = input.getLine(); 
                state.text = null; 
                mFirstBodyString(); 
                state.type = BodyString; 
                emit(); 
                return state.token; 
            } catch (NoViableAltException nva) { 
                reportError(nva); 
                recover(nva); // throw out current char and try 
again 
            } catch (RecognitionException re) { 
                reportError(re); 
                // match() routine has already called recover() 
            }     
        } 
        return super.nextToken(); 
    } 
} 
 
 
prog : statement*; 
 
statement 
    : simpleStatement? BodyString 
    | '{' statement '}' -> statement 
    | bracketedBlock 
    //| UnquotedString Colon statement -> ^(Label UnquotedString 
statement) 
    | classDefinition 
    | interfaceDefinition 
    | complexStatement 
    | simpleStatement ';'! 
    ; 
     
bracketedBlock 
    : '{' stmts=statement* '}' -> ^(Block $stmts) 
    ; 
 
interfaceDefinition 
    : Interface interfaceName=UnquotedString interfaceExtends? 
        OpenCurlyBrace 
        interfaceMember* 
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        CloseCurlyBrace 
        -> ^(Interface $interfaceName interfaceExtends? 
interfaceMember*) 
    ; 
 
interfaceExtends 
    : Extends^ UnquotedString (Comma! UnquotedString)* 
    ; 
interfaceMember 
    : Const UnquotedString (Equals atom)? ';'  
        -> ^(Const UnquotedString atom?) 
    | fieldModifier* Function UnquotedString parametersDefinition 
';' 
        -> ^(Method ^(Modifiers fieldModifier*) UnquotedString 
parametersDefinition) 
    ; 
 
classDefinition 
    :   classModifier?  
        Class className=UnquotedString  
        (Extends extendsclass=UnquotedString)?  
        classImplements? 
        OpenCurlyBrace 
        classMember* 
        CloseCurlyBrace  
        -> ^(Class ^(Modifiers classModifier?) $className 
^(Extends $extendsclass)? classImplements? 
            classMember* 
        ) 
    ; 
     
classImplements 
    :  Implements^ (UnquotedString (Comma! UnquotedString)*) 
    ; 
 
classMember 
    : fieldModifier* Function UnquotedString parametersDefinition  
        (bracketedBlock | ';') 
        -> ^(Method ^(Modifiers fieldModifier*) UnquotedString 
parametersDefinition bracketedBlock?) 
    | Var Dollar UnquotedString (Equals atom)? ';'  
        -> ^(Var ^(Dollar UnquotedString) atom?)  
    | Const UnquotedString (Equals atom)? ';'  
        -> ^(Const UnquotedString atom?) 
    | fieldModifier* (Dollar UnquotedString) (Equals atom)? ';'  
        -> ^(Field ^(Modifiers fieldModifier*) ^(Dollar 
UnquotedString) atom?) 
    ; 
 
fieldDefinition 
    : Dollar UnquotedString (Equals atom)? ';'-> ^(Field ^(Dollar 
UnquotedString) atom?) 
129 
 
    ; 
     
classModifier 
    : 'abstract'; 
     
fieldModifier 
    : AccessModifier | 'abstract' | 'static'  
    ; 
 
 
complexStatement 
    : If '(' ifCondition=expression ')' ifTrue=statement 
conditional? 
        -> ^('if' expression $ifTrue conditional?) 
    | For '(' forInit forCondition forUpdate ')' statement -> 
^(For forInit forCondition forUpdate statement) 
    | Foreach '(' variable 'as' arrayEntry ')' statement -> 
^(Foreach variable arrayEntry statement) 
    | While '(' whileCondition=expression? ')' statement -> 
^(While $whileCondition statement) 
    | Do statement While '(' doCondition=expression ')' ';' -> 
^(Do statement $doCondition) 
    | Switch '(' expression ')' '{'cases'}' -> ^(Switch expression 
cases) 
    | functionDefinition 
    ; 
 
simpleStatement 
    : Echo^ commaList 
    | Global^ name (','! name)* 
    | Static^ variable Equals! atom 
    | Break^ Integer? 
    | Continue^ Integer? 
    //| Goto^ UnquotedString 
    | Return^ expression? 
    | RequireOperator^ expression 
    | expression 
    ; 
 
 
conditional 
    : ElseIf '(' ifCondition=expression ')' ifTrue=statement 
conditional? -> ^(If $ifCondition $ifTrue conditional?) 
    | Else statement -> statement 
    ; 
 
forInit 
    : commaList? ';' -> ^(ForInit commaList?) 
    ; 
 
forCondition 
    : commaList? ';' -> ^(ForCondition commaList?) 
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    ; 
     
forUpdate 
    : commaList? -> ^(ForUpdate commaList?) 
    ; 
 
cases  
    : casestatement*  defaultcase 
    ; 
 
casestatement 
    : Case^ expression ':'! statement* 
    ; 
 
defaultcase  
    : (Default^ ':'! statement*) 
    ; 
 
functionDefinition 
    : Function UnquotedString parametersDefinition bracketedBlock 
->  
        ^(Function UnquotedString parametersDefinition 
bracketedBlock) 
    ; 
 
parametersDefinition 
    : OpenBrace (paramDef (Comma paramDef)*)? CloseBrace -> 
^(Params paramDef*)  
    ; 
 
paramDef 
    : paramName (Equals^ atom)? 
    ; 
 
paramName 
    : Dollar^ UnquotedString 
    | Ampersand Dollar UnquotedString -> ^(Ampersand ^(Dollar 
UnquotedString)) 
    ; 
 
commaList 
    : expression (','! expression)*  
    ; 
     
expression 
    : weakLogicalOr 
    ; 
 
weakLogicalOr 
    : weakLogicalXor (Or^ weakLogicalXor)* 
    ; 
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weakLogicalXor 
    : weakLogicalAnd (Xor^ weakLogicalAnd)* 
    ; 
     
weakLogicalAnd 
    : assignment (And^ assignment)* 
    ; 
 
assignment 
    : name ((Equals | AsignmentOperator)^ assignment) 
    | ternary 
    ; 
 
ternary 
    : logicalOr QuestionMark expression Colon expression -> 
^(IfExpression logicalOr expression*) 
    | logicalOr 
    ; 
     
logicalOr 
    : logicalAnd (LogicalOr^ logicalAnd)* 
    ; 
 
logicalAnd 
    : bitwiseOr (LogicalAnd^ bitwiseOr)* 
    ; 
     
bitwiseOr 
    : bitWiseAnd (Pipe^ bitWiseAnd)* 
    ; 
 
bitWiseAnd 
    : equalityCheck (Ampersand^ equalityCheck)* 
    ; 
 
equalityCheck 
    : comparisionCheck (EqualityOperator^ comparisionCheck)? 
    ; 
     
comparisionCheck 
    : bitWiseShift (ComparisionOperator^ bitWiseShift)? 
    ; 
 
bitWiseShift 
    : addition (ShiftOperator^ addition)* 
    ; 
     
addition 
    : multiplication ((Plus | Minus | Dot)^ multiplication)* 
    ; 
 
multiplication 
132 
 
    : logicalNot ((Asterisk | Forwardslash | Percent)^ 
logicalNot)* 
    ; 
 
logicalNot 
    : Bang^ logicalNot 
    | instanceOf 
    ; 
 
instanceOf 
    : negateOrCast (Instanceof^ negateOrCast)? 
    ; 
 
negateOrCast 
    : (Tilde | Minus | SuppressWarnings)^ increment 
    | OpenBrace PrimitiveType CloseBrace increment -> ^(Cast 
PrimitiveType increment) 
    | OpenBrace! weakLogicalAnd CloseBrace! 
    | increment 
    ; 
 
increment 
    : IncrementOperator name -> ^(Prefix IncrementOperator name) 
    | name IncrementOperator -> ^(Postfix IncrementOperator name) 
    | newOrClone 
    ; 
 
newOrClone 
    : New^ nameOrFunctionCall 
    | Clone^ name 
    | atomOrReference 
    ; 
 
atomOrReference 
    : atom 
    | reference 
    ; 
 
arrayDeclaration 
    : Array OpenBrace (arrayEntry (Comma arrayEntry)*)? CloseBrace 
-> ^(Array arrayEntry*) 
    ; 
 
arrayEntry 
    : (keyValuePair | expression) 
    ; 
 
keyValuePair 
    : (expression ArrayAssign expression) -> ^(ArrayAssign 
expression+) 
    ; 
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atom: SingleQuotedString | DoubleQuotedString | HereDoc | Integer 
| Real | Boolean | arrayDeclaration 
    ; 
 
reference 
    : Ampersand^ nameOrFunctionCall 
    | nameOrFunctionCall 
    ; 
 
nameOrFunctionCall 
    : name OpenBrace (expression (Comma expression)*)? CloseBrace 
-> ^(Apply name expression*) 
    | name 
    ; 
 
name: staticMemberAccess 
    | memberAccess 
    | variable 
    ; 
     
staticMemberAccess 
    : UnquotedString '::'^ variable 
    ; 
 
memberAccess 
    : variable  
        ( OpenSquareBrace^ expression CloseSquareBrace! 
        | '->'^ UnquotedString)* 
    ; 
     
variable 
    : Dollar^ variable 
    | UnquotedString 
    ; 
 
BodyString  
    : '?>' (('<' ~ '?')=> '<' | ~'<' )* ('<?' ('php'?))? 
    ; 
 
fragment 
FirstBodyString 
    : (('<' ~ '?')=> '<' | ~'<' )* '<?' ('php'?) 
    ; 
 
MultilineComment     
    : '/*' (('*' ~ '/')=>'*' | ~ '*')* '*/' {$channel=HIDDEN;} 
    ; 
 
SinglelineComment 
    : '//'  (('?' ~'>')=>'?' | ~('\n'|'?'))* {$channel=HIDDEN;} 
    ; 
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UnixComment 
    : '#' (('?' ~'>')=>'?' | ~('\n'|'?'))* {$channel=HIDDEN;} 
    ; 
     
 
Array 
    : ('a'|'A')('r'|'R')('r'|'R')('a'|'A')('y'|'Y') 
    ; 
 
RequireOperator 
    : 'require' | 'require_once' | 'include' | 'include_once' 
    ; 
 
PrimitiveType 
    : 'int'|'float'|'string'|'array'|'object'|'bool' 
    ; 
 
AccessModifier 
    : 'public' | 'private' | 'protected'  
    ; 
 
fragment 
Decimal  
 :('1'..'9' ('0'..'9')*)|'0' 
 ; 
fragment 
Hexadecimal 
 : '0'('x'|'X')('0'..'9'|'a'..'f'|'A'..'F')+ 
 ; 
  
fragment 
Octal 
 : '0'('0'..'7')+ 
 ; 
Integer 
 :Octal|Decimal|Hexadecimal 
 ; 
  
fragment 
Digits 
 : '0'..'9'+ 
 ; 
  
fragment 
DNum 
 :(('.' Digits)=>('.' Digits)|(Digits '.' Digits?)) 
 ; 
  
fragment 
Exponent_DNum 
 :((Digits|DNum)('e'|'E')('+''-')?Digits) 
 ; 
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Real 
    : DNum|Exponent_DNum 
    ; 
 
Boolean 
    : 'true' | 'false' 
    ; 
 
SingleQuotedString 
    : '\'' (('\\' '\'')=>'\\' '\'' 
    |         ('\\' '\\')=>'\\' '\\'  
    |         '\\' | ~ ('\'' | '\\'))*  
      '\'' 
    ; 
 
fragment 
EscapeCharector 
    : 'n' | 'r' | 't' | '\\' | '$' | '"' | Digits | 'x' 
    ; 
 
DoubleQuotedString 
    : '"'  ( ('\\' EscapeCharector)=> '\\' EscapeCharector  
    | '\\'  
    | ~('\\'|'"') )*  
      '"' 
    ; 
 
HereDoc  
    : '<<<' HereDocContents 
    ; 
 
UnquotedString 
   : ('a'..'z' | 'A'..'Z' | '_')  ('a'..'z' | 'A'..'Z' | '0'..'9' 
| '_')* 
   ; 
    
fragment  
HereDocContents 
    : { 
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder(); 
        while(input.LA(1)!='\n'){ 
            sb.append((char)input.LA(1)); 
            input.consume(); 
        } 
        input.consume(); 
        String hereDocName = sb.toString(); 
        int hdnl = hereDocName.length(); 
        while(true){ 
            boolean matchEnd = true; 
            for(int i = 0; i<hdnl; i++){ 
                if(input.LA(1)!=hereDocName.charAt(i)){ 
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                    matchEnd=false; 
                    break; 
                } 
                input.consume(); 
            } 
            if(matchEnd==false){ 
                while(input.LA(1)!='\n'){ 
                    input.consume(); 
                } 
                input.consume(); 
            }else{ 
                break; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    ; 
 
AsignmentOperator 
    : '+='|'-='|'*='|'/='|'.='|'%='|'&='|'|='|'^='|'<<='|'>>=' 
    ; 
     
EqualityOperator 
    : '==' | '!=' | '===' | '!==' 
    ; 
 
ComparisionOperator 
    : '<' | '<=' | '>' | '>=' | '<>' 
    ; 
     
ShiftOperator 
    : '<<' | '>>' 
    ; 
 
IncrementOperator 
    : '--'|'++' 
    ; 
     
 
fragment 
Eol : '\n' 
    ; 
 
WhiteSpace 
@init{ 
    $channel=HIDDEN; 
} 
 : (' '| '\t'| '\n'|'\r')* 
 ; 
  
